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Based on past findings in the area of order effects in
persuasion, the purpose of this paper was to examine the effects
of the receiver characteristics of sex, self-esteem, and dogmatism,
message relevance, and order of presentation upon attitude change
and recall.

The study analyzed category differences and multivariate

relationships.

Interesting results were attained.

Males high in

esteem and dogmatism were not as easily persuaded as females high
in esteem and dogmatiam.

Females high in esteem responded with

a significant primacy effect, while females low in esteem responded
with a significant recency effect.

Subjects low in dogmatism

recalled more than subjects high in dogmatism.

Subjects in the

irrelevant message condition recalled more and were persuaded to a
greater degree than subjects in the relevant condition.

Recall

scores did not correlate highly with attitude change scores.

Finally,

the stepwise multiple regression equation revealed a small amount
of variation explained by the five predictor variables.
Based on application of theoretical assumptions and models
designed to predict primacy and recency to the results achieved,
the need for future research to follow the variables approach to
the issue became apparent.
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CHAPTER I

INTRJDUCTION, REVIEW OF LITERATURE,
AND RATIONALE

Introduction
This experimental undertaking has a basically straightforward
purpose:

it attempts to assess the effects of order of presentation

in a two-sided communication in relation to relevance of topic,
receiver personality variables of dogmatism and self-esteem, ana the
demographic variable of sex as these differentially affect attitude
change and recall.

In addition to an assessment of category differences,

the study will examine multivariate relationships and will develop a
predictive regression equation for attitude change and for recall.
Certain key terms must initially be defined.

In discussing

order effects of a two-sided cammunication, primacy refers to the
situation in which the argument given first, whether pro or con,

s

more

effective in changing opinion in the direction of the argument.
Recency refers to a similar effectiveness in changing opinion in the
direction of the argument presented last.
refers to the receivers
controversy.

Relevance of material

perceptiLn of topic interest, familiarity, and

Dogmatism refers to the relative open-cindedness of the

belief systems of an individual (i.e., the willingness of an individual
to bring together different parts of his belief systems in assessing
new information).

Finally, self-esteem refers to the individual's
1

2
feelings of personal adequacy, social adjustment with others, and
degree of anxiety in facing new situations.

Review of Literature
Contemporary speech manuals reflect mL,e interest in the
influence of serial arrangement in communication.

Their suggestions

are perhaps influenced by the large body of research in the area.
Research in order effects has concentrated on three basic
research designs, the first two of which are the effects of order
upon attitude and the effects of order upon recall.

Researchers

concerned with the effects of order upon recall have typically used
messages that differ somewhat from the norma_ rhetorical discourse,
such as broadcasts of different news events unrelated in nature
or content, biographical information, sequences of nonsense syllables,
or simple statements.

Researchers in persuasion, on the other hand,

have analyzed the effects in a more pragmatic rhetorical sense (e.g.,
the use of persuasive speeches or messages) in determining the effectiveness of different presentational orders.

The third area of

concentration has been the area of impression formation.

Researchers

in this category have not been concerned with shift of opinion per se,
but have been concerned more with the subjects' first impressions of
1
Erwin P. Bettinghaus, Persuasive Communication (New York:
Holt, Rineheart, and Winston, 1968), pp. 152-157; Jane Blankenship,
Public gsfaking (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1966),
pp. 9-92: Gary Cronkhite, Persuasive Speech and Behavioral gAregs
(New York: BobbseMerrill Co., 1969), pp. 195-204: James C. McCroskeys
An Introduction to Rhetoric and Communication (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: BobbseMerrill Co., 1968), pp. 150-151; Wayne C. Mennick,
The Art of Persuasion (Cambridge: Houghton-Mifflin Co., 1957), pp268-274: Wayne M. Thompson, Quantitative Research in Public Address and Communication (New York: Random House, 1967), 57 68-71.

of an individual based on factors such as receivers' .7ognitive
complexity, contradictory information about the individual, receiver
personality characteristics, and other variables that may influence
one's impression formation.
There have been relatively few attempts to provide a composite
picture of the theoretical interpretations for the causes and concomitant factors which influence order effects.

Lana provided a

limited review of three possible explanations for order effects, but
his review did not include other interpretations such as the "cognitive complexity" hypothesis, the "linear operation" hypothesis,
the "Ebbinghaus forgetting curve" hypothesis, the "weighted average"
2
hypothesis, or the "chang3 of meaning" hypothesis.

Also his review

did not take other factors into account which may influence but not
directly cause order effects, such as commitment, need-arousal,
or audience pre-disposition toward the topic, to name a few.

Rosnow

and Robinson stated that the attempts to provide a theoretical framework for order effects "have not met with much success."

More recently,

Crano argued that none of the predictive models has met "with more than
modest support, and the field today is no more consolidated, from the
4
standpoint of theoretical concensus, than it was in 1957."
The purpose of this section, then, is to provide a parsimonious
2
Robert E. Lana, "Three Theoretical Interpretations of Order
Effects in Persuasive Communications," Psychological Bulletin 61
(April 1964): 314-320.

3Ralph L. Rosnow and Edward J. Robinson, Experiments in
Persuasion (New York: Academic Press, 1967), p. 101.
4,
tiilliam D. Crano, "Primacy vs. Recency in Retention of
Information and Opinion Change," Journal of Social Psychology
101 (1977): R9.

14

review of research literature or the topic and suggest a more complete
view of the theoretical frameworks for the causes and concomitant
factors that tend to influence the effects of serial arrangement in
speech communication.

Such a review would serve to consolidate the

divergent findings into a single outline

and provide a possible

springboard for future research.

Causal Interpretations

The "Set" Hypothesis
The experiments of Asch, Luchins, and Anderson and Barrios
gave birth to a theoretical answer to the cause of primacy-recency
based on subjects' cognitive "set" or Einstel.i_ung, a term coined by
nineteenth century psychologists.

The founding principle is that

when a subject is confronted with unfamiliar material he will establish
a tendency to react later in terms of initial material rather than
in terms of material presented subsequently.

It is assumed that

prior to the presentation the subject has had no organization with
respect to the material.

The material presented will supply the

organization, thus influencing subsequent responses.

Based on this

principle, then, early advocates of the set theory maintained that when
5
Soloman E. Asch, Social Psychology (New York: Prentice Hall,
1952); Abraham 3. Luchins, "Definitiveness of Impression and PrimacyRecency in Communications," JSP 48 (November 1958): 275-290; Idem,
"Experimental Attempts to Minimize the Impact of First Impressions,"
in Carl I. Hovland, ed., The Order of Presentation in Persuasion
(New Haven: The Yale University Press, 1957), PP- 62-78; Idem,
"Primacy-Recency in Impression Formation," in Hovland, The Order
of Presentation, pp. 33-61; Norman H. Anderson and Alfred A. Barrios,
"Primacy Effects in Personality Impression Formation," Journal of
ALnormal and Social Psychology 63 (1961): 346-350.

one is confronted with a communication about a novel subject that
supports an opinion, subsequent communications will be relatively
ineffective in producing opinion change.
Order effects research has not always followed the strict
condition of primacy or novelty of information.
two categories of order effects studies:

Schultz defined

the "true" primacy study

which subjects have had no prior contact with the information
presented, and the "experimentally induced" primacy study in which
5
the subjects have had prior contact with the information used.

As

a general rule, the true primacy studies have been those of impression
formation, as the subjects could have had no prior contact with the
information (i.e., information about a ficticious character's personality).

Conversely, the experimentally induced primacy studies have

been those using speech topics concerning relevant social issues.
The controversy that arises here is one of applicability.

Can the set

explanation adequately predict attitude change in experimentally
induced primacy studies?

An examination of the results of empirical

research on the issue follows.
Luchins' studies were concerned with presenting descriptions

7

of a character, Jim, to subjects.

The descriptions were taken from

a continuum of extroversive-introversive personality characteristics,
thus basically contradictory in nature, and reversed in order for each
group.

The complete lack of familiarity with the information presented

was assured, as the character described was ficticious.

6

Duane P. Schultz, "Primacy-Recency within a Sensory Variation
Framework," Psychological Record 13 (1963): 129-139.

7

Luchins, "Primacy-Recency," pp. 33-61: Mem, 'Experimental
Attempts," pp. 56-78.

6
Luchins found consistent primacy effects.

He favored the

set theory as the explanation, in that the initial description
directed the later opinions of snbjects in =eh the same manner that
initial solutions to problems often direct subsequent solutions
to similar problems.

Luchins was further able to minimize the

effect of primacy by inserting statements such as "I want each of you
to suspend judgement of the individual about wham you are to read
until you have finished reading all that is written about him.
make snap judgements.

8
Take into account all you read."

Don't

With the

application of these statements Luchins was able to minimize the primacy
effect, depending on how early or late the warning came in the procedure.

In a similar experiment Luchins, and also Mayo and Crockett,

found a recency effect when a questionnaire was inserted between
the two communications.'

This result was also later reported by

10
Rosenkrantz and Crockett.
Anderson and Barrios have reported experiments supporting the
set hypothesis as well.

They also used favorable and unfavorable

personality adjectives about an individual, finding significant
support for the initial material presented.

8
Luchins, "Experimental Attempts," p. 65.
9
'Idem, "Definitiveness of Impression," pp. 275-290; Clara
W. Mayo and Walter H. Crockett, "Cognitive Complexity and PrimacyRecency in Impression Formation," JASP 68 (January 1964): 335-338.
10
Paul S. Rosenkrantz and Walter H. Crockett, "Same Factors
Influencing the Assimilation of Desperate Information in Impression
Formation," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 2 (September
1965): 397-402.
11

Norman H. Anderson dnd Alfred A. Barrios, "Primacy Effects
in Personality Impression Formation," JASP 63 (1961): 346-350.

7
The results of several experiments do not support the set
hypothesis, however.

Lana argued that the results of opposing studies

may have been due to situations in the experiments that did not adhere
to conditions necessary for correct predictions fram the set hypothe.

12

Wilson further attempted to specify the "standard" conditions

necessary to predict primacy.

They are:

(a) a written verbal

description of an individual, (b) opposed cammunications presented one
13
after the other, and (c) an immediate post test.

Nevertheless,

Rosenkrantz and Crockett followed Wilson's standard conditions and were
14
unable to find a significant primacy effect.
In a study by Lana, a consistent primacy effect was found
15
when subjects were low in familiarity.

This effect would seem to

suggest that adding topic familiarity alters the set explanation,
since highly familiar groups yielded a significant primacy effect
in Lana's study, as did campletely novel topics in the studies
mentioned previously.

The contradiction that arises here is magnified

by other research findings.

Rosnow duplicated Lana's results and

16
found that sublects low in familiarity responded with recency effects.
12
Lana, "Three Interpretations," pp. 314-320.
13
Warner Wilson, "Primacy or Recency of Communications as a
Function of Forcefulness of Presentation," fuchological Reports
23 (August-December 1968): 1135-1141.
14
Rosenkrantz and Crockett, "Factors Influencing Assimilation, 111
397-402.
15
Robert E. Lana, "Familiarity and the Order of Presentation
in Persuasive Communications," JAS? 62 (1961): 573-577.
Ralph L. Rosnow, "Opinion Change and Order of Presentation
In Experimentally Manipulated Anxiety and in Natural Familiarity
with a topic," (Ph.D. dissertation, :Lmerican University, 1962).

8
Using controversial topics, Thomas, Webb, and Tweedie also found
results inconsistent with the set explanation in that no consistent
17
primacy effects were evident among unfamiliar groups.

In a second

study, Lana found that primacy appeared in groups exposed to a familiar,
controversial and interesting topic, while no primacy effects occurred
18
among unfamiliar groups.
Lana finally concluded that the "set
hypothesis would have predicted a recency effect. . .or no effect
19
at all" for the familiar groups.
In sum, early researchers in the vein of the "set" explanation
for primacy-recency effects assumed that in order for a set to
occur there had to be total absence of prior contact of subjects
with the topics.

Subsequent research by Rosnow, Lana, and Thomas,

Webb, and Tweedie has suggested that the set theory may not accurately
predict what happens when a topic is highly familiar since the set
theory is oriented toward the paramount importance of topic unfamiliarity.
Their studies included topics of current social issues which were
highly interesting, familiar, and controversial.

In these instances

the set explanation was unable to predict the results since the
subjects obviously had same degree of contact with the topics used.
Interesting results were obtained.

In all cases there was found no

primacy effect among unfamiliar groups while highly familiar groups
17
Edwin J. Thomas, Susan Webb, and Jean Tweedie, 'Effects
of Familiarity with a Controversial Issue on Acceptance of Successive
Persuasive Communications," JASP 63 (July 1961): 656-659.
18
Robert E. Lana, "Order Effects in Persuasive Communications,"
Progress Report, May, 1962, United States Mental Health Service,
National Institute of Mental Health. In Lana, "Three Interpretations,"
p. 317.
19
Ibid.

yield strong primacy effects.

In a discussion of whether or not the

set theory may adequately predict recency on the basis of the inconsistent results of these studies, Lana stated:

"At this point

it is better to conclude that the set hypothesis is not structured
to explain order effects when communications concerning relevant
social problems are involved, rather than to conclude it is made tenuous"
20
by the results of such studies.

The Ebbinghaus Negatively Accelerated
Forgetting Curve Interpretation
Miller and Campbell present a theoretical model to explain
21
order effects derived fram prior research by Ebbinghaus.

In it

they assume that the persuasive impact of a message is a function of
its retention.

According to the theory, changes in opinion over time

should parallel those of retention, and measures of opinion should
correlate highly with those of retention.

To explain the foundation of

their hypothesis they state:
Our Judgements, our responses, our social perceptions are
a function of same net resultant of the past experiences, both
recent and remote. To the net resultant for the moment not all
past experiences contribute equally. . .were it not so unlearning
and new learning could not take place. . .The momentary advantage
of the very recent may allow trivial events of this morning
to outweigh momentarily more significant learnings of the past,
but this momentary advantage of the moment will dissipate rapidly
allowing the relative influence of the older learnings to recover
spontaneously tomorrow, or the next day, if the events like this
morning prove to be untypical and do not recur.'2
2
°Ibid.
21

Norman Miller and Donald T. Campbell, "Recency and Primacy
in Persuasion as a Function of the Timing of Speeches and Measurements," JASP 59 (1959): 1-9.
22 .
Ibid., p.

10
re.

they state Jost's second law:

"Of two

associations equally strong at the moment, the older will decay
less rapidly,"

23
suggesting a primacy effect with time.

In their

study the order in which successive arguments were presented (procon and con-pro), the time interval between them (none and one weeV),
and the time of testing (immediately after the last communication and
one week after) were varied for eight groups, each tested once.
When subjects were tested immediately after hearing both communications
one after the other, a recency effect was found.

This finding was

explained by the Ebbinghaus curves in that while it is logical
to assume that almost any effect could occur when social issues :ire
used as topics, a speech will have an effect in its intended direction
if the effect is measured immediately.

Thus, in situations in which

there is immediate testing after the first communication a primacy
effect should occur, yet a test after the second communication should
modify the original primacy effect providing a weak primacy effect,
or possibly no effect.

When there is immediate testing after the last

communication only, a recency effect is predicted, but the advantage
of recency will dissipate rapidly with time, such that a delayed
test may reveal a weak primacy effect, no effect, or a weak recency
effect, depending on the degree of the time interval of the delay.
This rather interesting result (previously stated by Jost's second
law) is based on an assumption that there was an initially higher
level of strength for the first than for the second message (see Figure 1).
23
Adolf Jost, "Die Assoziationsfestighkeit in Ihur Abhangkeit von der Vertilung der Wiederholoungen," Zeitschrift fur
Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane 14 (1879): 436-472,
cited in Miller and Campbell, "Recency and Primacy," p. 1.

11
Simply stated, with any two messages presented one after the other
there is a higher degree of strength of association for the first,
and subsequently less material forgotten over time for the first
than for the second message.

The greatest recency effect occurs

when there is a long delay between first and second communications
coupled with an immediate post test after the second communication,
the strength of recency being minimal when the two presentations are
contiguous, and testing delayed.
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Fig. 1. Hypothetical forgetting curves for two
competing communications. Note the higher initial starting
position and final asymptote of line A in camparisor with
lines B or B'. A represents the first message, B represents
the second message immediately after the first, B' represents
the second message one week after the first message, and
the vertical slicings represent testings of attitude and recall.
Condition 1 represents immediate testing after contiguous
communications. :
, ondition 2 represents delayed testing after
contiguous communications. Condition 3 represents a delay
between the communications with immediate testing after the
last communication. Condition 4 represents a delay between
the communications, as well as a delay of testing after the
last communication.

12
In Figure 1 the solid line (line A) represents the contribution
of an initial communication, its strength decreasing as time elapses.
The two dotted lines represent the opposing communication presented
at two distinct times.

Line B represents the opposing communication

occurring immediately after the first one, and line B' at any point
in time represents an index of the net effects of the two communications
in combination.

The vertical :ine slicings in the diagram represent

a measure of the net effect, designated as conditions one through
four.

Five predictions emerge stated in terms of the relative magnitude

of the recency effect:

3

3l, 3>2, 1>2, and

14>2.

Miller and Campbell suggest that the finding of a recency
effect in the study actually improves the case for a general law of
primacy.

The method employed in most order effects studies to date

has been one in which subjects are tested immediately after contiguous
communications.

"This is a ::ondition that is not optimal to the

24
manifestation of either primacy or recency," they go on to state.
The insonsistent results found to date could be explained in terms of
an always present primacy effect, with experimental conditions in the
individual studies mediating and frequently masking the results
by an also present recency effect.

The finding of both primacy and

recency in this study seems to suggest that "coming first gives a
statement no greater probability of being remembered but does give
25
it a greater probability of being believed."
24
Miller and Campbell, "hecency and Primacy,' p. 8.
25
Ibid.

13
Insko tested the Miller and Campbell theory using recall as
a measure of retention and longer interval periods between the commun26
ications and measurements.
As regards opinion change, his results
paralleled those of Miller and Campbell.

The results failed to

support the theory that delayed measurement in the group with no
time interva_ interpolated between the communications would produce
more primacy or less recency than occurs without the delay.

As

regards retention as a function of the timing of communications,
the longer the time interval between the opposing communications,
the greater the recency effect an retention measured immediately
after the second communication.

A decreasing recency effect occurs

as the time interval between the second communication and measurement increases.
Zdep and Wilson similarly tested the Miller and Campbell
2?
theory, only to uncover inconsistent resu,tE-:.

Their design incorp-

orated the use of a jury trial situation and differed from Miller and
Campbell's model in the use of interpolated written material rather
than interpolation of time between the communications.

It was expected

that the written material would cause a significant amount of forgetting,
comparable to the interpolation of time.

Contrary to the predictions

from the Miller and Campbell model, under the second condition of
contiguous speeches and immediate testing, a significant recency effect
26
Chester A. Insko, "Primacy versus Recency in Persuasion as
a Function of the Timing of Arguments and Measures," JASP 69
(July 1964): 381-391.
2?
Stanley Zdep and Warner Wilson, "Recency Effects in Opinion
Fbrmation," Psychological Reports 23 (August-December 1968):
.195-2U0.
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was found.

They point out, however, that the task interpolation was

perhaps too short to cause forgetting, a factor doubtlessly affecting
the outcome.

In commenting on the Zdep and illson study, Miller

suggested that a further experimental design error may have contributed
to the results:

the speeches used in the study were eighty percent
28
shorter than those used in the Miller and Campbell study.
In a
later comment Wilson agreed with Miller stating that more research is
required to "(a) present relevant data, (b) demonstrate the model's
reliability through replication, and (c) demonstrate its robustness
29
in the face of changes in supposedly irrelevant factors."
Wilson and Miller also tested the Miller and Campbell model
JU
adding repetition as a variable.
In terms of relative retention of
material the Miller and Campbell model was confirmed dramatically.
However, the opinion results indicated a marked discrepancy.

Recency

effects under condition three (time interval between communications
with immediate testing after the second communication) were not more
pronounced than recency effects for other conditions.

In fact,

recency in condition one (contiguous communications with immediate
testing after the second communication) was as strong as recency for
condition three.
28
Norman Miller, "Comments on hdep and Wilson, Psychological
Reports 23 (August-December 1968): 377-378.
29
Warner Wilson, "In Accord with Norman Miller on Recency,"
Psychological Reports 23 (August-December 1968): 386.
30
Warner Wilson and Howard Miller, "Repetition, Order of
Presentation, and Timing of Arguments and Measures as Determinants
of Opinion Change," JPSP 9 (June 1968): 184-188.
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One criticism of the Miller and Campbell study and other studies
employing the same design is that they assume retention to be a cause
of opinion, and that a measure of retention will signify a measure
of opinion.

Insko points out, however, that "both opinion and retention

may covary as a function of the timing of communications and measures
31
without one being causally prior to the other."

In fact, Crano

found that opinion and retention are not causally related.

He stated:

"it seems apparent then. . .that tne simpie isomorpniam of retention
and attitude, so long an article of faith of the classical attitude
32
theorists, simply does not exist."

Certainly more research is needed

to validate the assumptions implicit in the application of the
LObinghaus negatively accelerated forpett.ing curves to persuasion.
Since Miller and Campbell assume persuasion as a function of
retention, studies that test recall became relevant to a discussion of
order effects in persuasion.

While these studies use distinctly dif-

ferent topic material than is used in the persuasion studies, their
applicability to primacy-recency is granted by the research of Ebbinghaus and subsequently confirmed by the Miller and Campbell model.
;Jiams and Doob found contradictory results when applied to

33

the forgetting curve theory.

Adams had two sets of advertisements

drawn up for a particular product and placed on the inside front cover
and first page of a magazine.

In one set the advertisements were

31
Insko, "Primacy versus Recency,' p. 390.
12
Crano, "Primacy vs. Recency," p.

94.

33H. F. Adams, "The Effect of Climax and Anti-climax Order,"
Journal of Applied Psychology 4 (1920): 330-338; Leonard W. Doob,
"The Effects of Initial SerialPositioning and Attitude upon Recall
under Conditions of Low Motiation," JASF 48 (January 1953):
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visually large on the inside front cover and small on the first page,
;;hile the second set was arranged in small-large order.

Subjects

perceiving them in terms of large -small remembered more about them
than those perceiving them small-large, thus suggesting primacy-where Miller and Campbell would have predicted recency.

Doob had

subjects view a short newsreel of current events or read five short
prose selections.

Later, subjects attempted to recall as much as

possible about the material seen.
and concluded:

Doob found no significant result

"People may remember that which they have experienced

intensely, but their recall may not be very accurate or detailed.
People may remember that which they wish to remember, but only when

34

a drive provides the incentive."

Doob's results are supportive of

the Miller and Campbell hypothesis in that delay after contiguous
communications may yield a weak recency effect, or no effect, and
perhaps primacy, if the delay is sufficiently long.
Jersild investigated subjects' retention of each of seventy
biographical statements presented in three orders, initial, middle

35

and final.

His results, contradicting those of Miller and Campbell,

suggested a primacy effect, in that statements at the very beginning
were remembered better than those at the end.

A later study by

Ehrensenberger, replicating Jersild's method, however, found support
for recency, stating:

"Little difference exists between primacy and

middle and between middle and recency, but a noticeable difference

34

Doob, "Initial Serial Positioning," p. 207.
35
A. T. Jersild. "Modes of Emphasis in Public Speaking,"
JAP 12 (1928): 611-620.
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36
is evident between primacy and recency."
Tannenbaum found further support for the theory as he investilYated the relationship between order of presentation and retention
37
His results
of each of twelve items presented in a radio newscast.
favored recency, as would be predicted from the Miller and Campbell
model.
Sponberg's research is perhaps the most notable in retention
38
While his study was primarily
of aurally perceived messages.
concerned with a pattern or arrangement of arguments within a single
speech rather than arguments presented in seperate speeches, order
effects were definitely a side issue and his study then becomes relevant.
In his study a twenty minute speech containing three arguments was
presented aurally to two matched audiences in climax and anti-climax
order.

His approach to the issue of relative strength of arguments

was different from that of prior researchers.

He suggested that

normally in rhetoric "space-emphasis is positively correlated with

39

the importance of expressed ideas."

The more important an idea is

the more space it will receive in terms of development and explanation,
and consequently will be perceived as proportionally more emphatic
than other less developed arguments.

Thus climax order was that

36
Ray Ehrensenberger, "An Experimental Study of the Relative
Effectiveneas of Certain Forms of Emphasis in Public Speaking,"
Speech Monographs 12 (1945): 101.
37
Percy H. Tannenbaum, "Effect of Serial Position on Recall
13aarterly 31 (1954): 319-323.
of Radio News Stories," Journalism 2
38
Harold Sponberg, "A Study of the Relative Effectiveness
of Climax and Anti-climax jrder in an Argumentative Speech,"
SM 13 (1946): 35-44.
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arrangement with least space-emphasis occurring first, and anti-climax
order was that arrangement with most space-emphasis occurring first.
Loosely applied, Sponberg's findings contradicted those predicted by
the Miller and Campbell model in that primacy occurred when the large
space-emphasis argument occurred first with an immediate test after
the cammunication.

Miller and Campbell would have predicted recency.

However, ten to thirteen days later the subjects were asked to
complete a second retention test, and primacy was the result--a finding
expected by the Miller and Campbell interpretation.
Gilkinson, Paulson, and Sikkink reported data that neither
40
confirm contradict the hypothesis.

Their research design was

basically a replication of Sponberg's.

They found no overall support

for primacy or recency in meseage retention.
In sum, a predictive interpretation based on the Ebbinghaus
neRatively accelerated forgetting curve
Campbell in 1959.

Was

advanced by Miller and

Since then the model has been tested on numerous

occasions, being neither proven nor disproven, and certainly more
research is necessary to validate the underlying assumptions.

The "Cognitive Complexity" Hypothesis
Through examining studies of order effects in impression
formation Crockett has formed a theoretical framework based an the
41
principle of cognitive complexity.

Crockett derived his concept

40
Howard Gilkinson, Stanley F. Paulson, and Donald E. Sikkink,
"Effects of Order and Authority in an Argumentative Speech," Quarterly
Journal of Speech 40 (April 1954): 183-192.
41
Walter H. Crockett, "Cognitive Complexity and Impression
Formation," in Brendon ft. Maher, ed., Progress in Experimental Personality Research, vol. 2 (New 'fork! Academie Press, 1965), pp. 47-81.
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fram Warner's developmental psychology which suggests that the
development of cognition or any other psychological function involves
an increased "differentiation and articulation of elements, And,
simultaneously, an increased interdependence of elements as they are
42
integrated into a hierarchically arranged system."
This suggests
that as new concepts are taken in by an individual, certain relationships are established between concepts, and some concepts become
subordinate to others as they are hierarchically arranged.

Subjects

high in cognitive complexity, then, would be expected to process
inconsistent information differently than individuals low in cognitive complexity.
In 1946 Asch conducted an experiment in which he read a list
of positive-negative or negative-positive adjectives about an individual
43
to differing groups of subjects.

He found that the subjects tended

to describe the person in much the same manner as that of the information
presented first.

Similarly, Luchins gave subjects, in differing orders,

two one-paragraph statements about a boy, one of which pictured him
44
as an extrovert, the other as an introvert.

Again the results

showed that the subjects were most affected by the first block of
information presented.

However, Luchins, in a subsequent experiment

required subjects to respond on a questionnaire after reading the
45
first paragraph and again after the second one.

His results were

42
Ibid., p. 49.
43
Asch, "Forming Impressions," pp. 258-290.
44
Luchins, "Experimental Attempts," pp. 62-78; Idem, "PrimacyRecency," pp. 33-61.
45
Idem, "Definitiveness of Impression," pp. 275-290.
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diametrically opposed to those achieved earlier.
Crockett suggested the following explanation.

In the exper-

iments without the written impression between the two communications,
the items early in the sequence formed a context into which subsequent
items could be assimilated; those not able to be assimilated into
context would be ignored.

In the experiment with the questionnaire

between the two communications as well as after the two communications,
the subjects were forced to extend cheir impression of the person
thus forming a clear, well-rounded impression after hearing only the
first message.

When the second communication was read it clashed so

markedly with the previously extended impression that the information
could not be assimilated into the first theme, thus forcing a revision
of the impression.
From this theoretical framework, a subject high in complexity,
compared with a subject low in complexity, would be expected to "(a) form
a less univalent impression from the first univalent block of information,
and (b) to change this impression less completely upon presentation of a
46
block of information opposite in valence."
An experiment designed to test this hypothesis used cognitively complex and cognitively simple subjects hearing four speakers
presenting positive °I- negative descriptions of a ficticious young
47
man named Joe.

After recording their impressions of Joe on a

questionnaire they listened to four more taped recordings of descriptions
of the same man, all differing in valence to those of the first tape.
46
Crockett, "Cognitive Complexity," p. 71.
47
Ibid.
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Subjects then filled out questionnaires of their impressions.
The results indicated both favorable and unfavorable responses
to the hypothesis.

First, the univalence of all subjects' impressions

after the first tape recorded description of the individual was substantially determined by the valence of the first communication.
However, contrary to the hypothesis, subjects high in complexity were
'not significantly less prone than the lows to record univalent im48
pressions after hearing only univalent information."

Secondly,

wnile alS subjects' impressions cnangec after nearing tne seconc
block of informatior, the relationship of cognitive complexity to
the strength of the changes were as predicted:

cognitively simple

subjects showed recency effects as strong as their initial primacy
effects, and cognitively complex subjects showed final Impressions
equably ambivalent.
Unfortunately, in this experiment all subjects responded
on a questionnaire twice, making it impossible to determine whether
the effects found by Asch, Luchins, and others in studies not incorporating
an intervening impression would have occurred more completely in
lows tan in highs.

49
An experiment by Rosenerantz tested this hypothesis.

His results, however, did not completely support the hypothesis,
in that the expected effects of cognitive complexity were not attained.
Present, however, was a significant interaction of sex and complexity.

As expected, men high in complexity showed ambivalent

Impressions, wnile tnose low in complexity snowec strong recency

49
Pau1 S. Rosencrantz, "Relationship of Same Conditions of
Presentation and Cognitive Differentiation to Impression Formation,"
(Master's Thesis, Clark University, 1961).
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effects when the information was presented in univalent blocks of
information and less primacy when presented as alternating units
in which positive and negative information was presented together.
Among women the tendency was opposite that expected, with none of
the group means differing significantly.

The results were basically

the same for univalence scoring and integration of the written impressions.

Male subjects high in complexity showed less univalence

in impression than lows while an opposing nonsignificant trent
held true for women.
A study of cognitive complexity and performance stress effects
50
upon integration of contradictory information was conducted by Supnick.
As expected from the hypothesis, subjects under performance stress who
read portion:
, contradictory information about a boy showed signifir:antly more univalence than did subjects responding under no
stress.

There was, however, no consistent relationship between cog-

nitive complexity and univaience scoring or confidence in determining
impressions, and there was no interaction of complexity with the stress
condition.
Leventhal and Singer related the concept of cognitive complexity
and changes of impression upon receipt of contradictory information.
No clear cut relationship was found.

They did report, however, that the

50
L. E. Supnick, 'Differences in Univalence and Extremity of
Impressions of Others as a Function of Personal and Structural Variables,"
(Master's thesis, Clark University, 1964).
Si
H. Leventhal and D. L. Singer, "Cognitive Complexity, Impression
Formation and Impression Change," Journal of Personality 32 (1964):
210-226.
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rating behaviors of cognitively simple subjects reflected concern
for people's performance on surface dimensions (i.e., in terms of
accepted norms of good performance), while those high in complexity
52
searched for information bearing on the'inner substance of people."
Crockett's theoretical interpretation, at present, seems
insufficient to explain order effects in impression formation.
However, the recent research of Petronko and Perin supported the model
in that when two units of information were presented to subjects high
and low in cognitive complexity and a delayed measure was given after
the last communication, a more pronounced primacy effect was the result
53
for cognitively simple subjects than for cognitively complex subjects.
-.hen a task was interpolated between the two communications with an
immediate measure after the last communication a more pronounced
recency effect was found for cognitively simple subjects than for
cognitively complex subjects.

Even in light of this, the need for

further research is implied.

The "Sensory Variation" Hypothesis
One of the more recent attempts to uncover a theoretical
54
framework for the cause of order effects is that of Schultz.

His

hypotheses were made on the basis of psycho-...ogical work by Hebb, Scott,
Lindsley, Malmo, and Samuels which suggests that by nature man will
52
Ibid., p. 225.
55
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54
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seek high psychological activation, thus responding more strongly to
55
novel stimuli in a stimulus field.
This sensory variation will
immediately heighten one's arousal and interest and provide visor to
ongoing behavior.

As variations in stimulation are repeated, adaptation

to the repetitive stimulation readily develops and alertness decreases.
This process is termed sensory habituation by Schultz.

From this

perspective the following predictive hypotheses were formed:
(1) When a subject is newly initiated to a topic the first
communication is perceived as novel and thus stimulation produced increases awareness and alertness.

When the second communication is

presented it will provide little variation in the level of activation,
as it is less novel to the listener.

Hence, the listener will retain

focus on the initial material and respond accordingly, producing a
primacy effect.
(2) When subjects are questi3ned after the initial and the second
communication, it is assumed that in order to maintain the increased
activation produced by the first communication, the subject will respond in direct opposition to his response on the first questionnaire as
he completes the second questionnaire, yielding a recency effect.
(3) In instances where responses are required after the second
communication but a time interval or task is interpolated between the
communications to promote forgetting, the time interval or task interpolation may serve to dissipate the activation level induced by
the initial communication and, therefore, the second communication is
perceived as novel bringing about increased awareness and interest in it.
A recency effect, or no effect may occur.
5
5Ibid., p. 129-130.
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(4) In the experimentally induced primacy studies that utilize
topic?, Wedoh are not novel, the first communication will not produce
as much activation as it would have had it been an initial exposure.
It will, however, be perceived as somewhat novel, attracting same
arousa: and interest, yet a pronounced primacy effect is the expected
result.
(a)

However, if the social topic has more intense stimulus

value in terms of topic familiarity, controversy, or interest,
the dynamics parallel those of hypothesis one and a more pronounced
primacy effect should occur.

Schultz argued that topic familiarity,

interest, and controversy should have the same systematic status as
the subject's lack of familiarity with the topic, the dimension involved in the "true primacy" study.
(b) In study situations as in the above postulate (4a),
a recency effect should occur when a questionnaire is inserted between
the two communications.
Lana suggested that "since Schultz makes the same predictions
as set theorists (derived from differing initial assumptions) for his

56

true primacy studies his success is equal to theirs."

The problem

with the sensory variation interpretation arises when one considers
predictions from the experimentally induced primacy study postulates
4, 4a, and

b.

Lund reported a primacy effect when questionnaires were presented
after each speech, yet Schultz would have predicted a recency effect
by postulate two.

56
57

57 Sponberg found support for a recency effect among

Lana, "Three Interpretations," p. 319.
H. F. Lund, "The Psychc, ogy of Belief. IV.

The L..14 of Primacy

26
subjects whc were questioned after the communications, yet Schultz
predicts a primacy effect by postulates 4 and 4a.

58
Cromwell found

a recency effect when presenting questionnaires after the presentation
of both arguments, and Schultz would have predicted a primacy effect

59
by postulate 4.

Hovland and Mandell also replicated the Lund study,

60
finding inconsistent results with the theory.
Schultz is quick to point to studies by Lana for support for
the sensory variation hypothesis.

However, Lana points out:

Schultz does not report that, where postulate L. an 4a
predict the results for familiarity and controversy, they do not
adequately handle Lana's results in an experiment where high
interest groups yielded no effect and a medium interest group
yielded a primacy effect. . . . In another study high controversy,
in interaction with method of pretesting, yielded no order effW.,
and a medium controversy yielded a significant primacy effect.'Ji
Obviously, the sensory variation hypothesis, if not proven
false, is made tenuous by the results of these and other studies.
As indicated previously, more research incorporating Schultz's design

is needed to suggest the general applicability of this model.

The "Contrast-Assimilation and
Marnitude of Impact" Hypothesis
In persuasion a well pronounced principle dealing with how
individuals perceive messages has been clearly presented--that of

in Persuasion,"

JASP 20 (1925):

183-191.

58
Sponberg, "Climax and anti-climax Order," pp. 35-44.
59
Harvey Cr well, "The Relative Effect on Audience Attitude
of the First versus the Second Argumentative Speech in a Series,"
SM 17 (June 1950): 105-122.
60
Carl I. Hovland and Wallace Mandell, "Is there a 'Law of Primacy
in Persuasion'?" in Carl I. Hovland, Order of Presentation, pp. 13-22.
6/
Lana, "Three Interpretations," p. 319.

27
In the perception of communications, same

selective perception.

cues are attended to, others ignored, and yet still others may be
misperceived.

Sears and Freedman, and Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee

have investigated this factor in how individuals perceive political
52
They have isolated two variables
cLadidates of opposing parties.
that define the process.

When an individual perceives a message to

be closer to his awn opinion than it actually is, this perception
discrepancy is termed assimilation.

When a message is perceived

farther from one's own position than it actually is, contrast occurs.
Assimilation has the inherent effect of making messages seem fair
and impartial: contrast makes messages seem biased and propagandistic.
Rosnow and Robinson contend that although there are other variables
that may affect contrast-assimilation, messages that are already
63
close to one's own opinion are displaced even farther.
This was the finding of an earlier study by Hovland, Harvey, and
Sherif dealing with people's opinion of wet and dry counties and the
b4

acceptance of alcohol.

Rosnow and Robinson termed the proximity

of the recipient's stand to the speaker's stand the "communicant65
recipient discrepancy."

Other factors such as involvement with

the issues, commitment to the issues, positively and negatively
62
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16 (July1961): 409: B. R. Berelson, P. F. Lazarsfeld, and W. N.
McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954).
63
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perceived communications and communicators, and time are also important
to the concept.
Hovland and Pritzker maintained that if a person tends to
assimilate messages that are already close to his awn position ari
contrasts those opposing, the "magnitude of impact" of a persuasive
message should be determined by the existing communicant-recipient
66
discrepancy.

In effect, the amount of opinion change asked for

seems to determine the amount obtained.

In their study the items

advocating the most extreme change had more impact than the items
advocating only moderate change, which in turn had more impact than
items asking for only slight change.

The results indicated the amount

of opinion change obtained depends largely on the amount advocated.
Similar results were found by Goldberg; Fisher, Rubenstein, and
67
Freedman; and Fisher and iubin.
Anderson attempted to apply the principle to the primacy68
recency phenomenon.

He employed two successive communications

advocating proportionally the same amount of change.

In conditions

such as this it was discovered that the second message had the advantage,
66
Carl I. Hovland and Henry A. Pritzker, "Extent of Opinion
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257-261.
67
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Situation," JASP 56 (1958): 230-238.
68
Norman H. Anderson, "Test of a Model for Opinion Change,"
'ASP 59 (1959): 371-381.

in that the first message wouid move the opinions a given amount
thereby increasing the attitudinal distance between the communicant
and the recipient.

If the second message was proportionally as effective

as the first, because it demanded more than the first (due to the
increased communicant-recipient discrepancy), it achieved greater change.
As the model suggested, recency effects were discovered.

He concluded:

"These data make it clear that no general law of primacy or
69
recency can exist, in agreement with Hovland's conclusion."

Anderson's Three Theoretical Frameworks
kndersor read subjects a set of personality trait adjectives
and asked them how much they would like a person so described.70
generalized order effects paradigm

was

ea.p:Loyed.

A

Lech set consisted

of high or low value adjectives; into this set a block of three low
(or high, depending on the initial block of adjectives) adjectives
were interpolated at all possible ordinal positions.

The results

showed a straight line primacy effect; the net influence of an adjective decreased linearly with the ordinal position of the set.

From

this he formed three possible theoretical hypotheses.

The 'weighted Average" Model
In this model, the response to any set is a weighted mean
of the scale values of the adjectives in that set.

The scale value

represents a favorableness dimension: the weight represents the

69
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influence or importance of the adjectives in the total impression.
It is possible, therefore, to predict the response to all possible
orderings of adjectives.

The present study, however, did not test

all the possible predictions in the model, and Anderson points out
that further research is needed to prove its applicability.

The "Linear" Model
I, second interpretation of the data may be consideded in
terms of a proportional change, or linear model derived from previous
71
research by Anderson and Hovland.

This model posits that impression

develops step-by-step as each successive adjective is presented.
The difference between this and the weighted average model is that
the weighted average modei considers only the finai response, whereas
the linear model considers the final response as the end result of a
step-by-step building of impression.

The "Change of Meaning" Interpretation
Asch previously suRpested this interpretation through his
72
"directed impression" hypothesis.

It is assumed that the initial

adjectives in a set establish a directed impression that may change
the effective meanings of later adjectives.

In attempting to form

a unified impression the subject seeks out the shades of meanings
of later adjectives that fit in the directed impression established
by the initial adjectives.

This interpretation may not be consistent

with the data, however, for unlike the previous two interpretations
71,
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which deal with changes in weight or importance of adjectives, this
one attributes primacy and recency to changes in scale value.
Chalmers, Stewart, and Anderson and Hubert gave support
for the weighted average model while Anderson and Norman argue

73

directly against the change of meaning interpretation.

Jaccard

74
and Fishhein offer no support for the change of meaning theory.

The "Attention Decrement" Hypothesis
A more recent theoretical model was suggested first by

75

Anderson and Barrios and later by Hendrick and Constantini.

These theorists suggested that primacy is due in part to a progressive
decrease in attention over the adjectives in a given set.

76
port for this theory was advanced by Stewart and Brink.
and Fishbein question it

PaE

Further supJaccard

77
an explanatory tool for order effects."
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The "Discounting" Hypothesis
k final theoretical answer to the question of primacy-recency
78
was given by Anderson and Jacobson.

They suggested that a sublect

may not give equal weight to all traits presented by the researcher,
and hence may discount those traits that are inconsistent with the
other traits in a stimulus set.

Since most of the impression formation

studies use opposing blocks of information, it is conceivable that
the subject would discount the entire second block.

Hendrick and

Constantini found support for this theory with significant primacy
effects, while other research by Anderson, Shafer, and McGinnis and
79
Oziel seems to credit this interpretation also.

Concoaitant F.Actors Affecting
Primacy-Recency
Concurrent to research assertaining the causes of primacy
and recency in persuasive communications, recallipand impression
formation, recent research has sought to detect specific factors that
may influence order effects.
o

Interestingly, Cram observed that most

the research in this area has been the

80
variety."

all scale, atheoretical

From this effort six areas of research concentration emerge.
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"Commitment" Factors
Hovland and Mandell have investigated the effects of inserting
an anonymous questionnaire between successive pro and con arguments.

ql

It was believed that expressing one's belief on a questionnaire
after hearing only a single side may force the recepient to commit
himself to a position adopted after hearing only the first communication.

'-und and Knower were previously concerned with shift of

82
opinion based on visually perceived messages.

Subjects were to

read affirmative and negative or negative and affirmative arguments
and then respond on a questionnaire.

It was found that the first

argument showea a more marked effect than the second argument.
Cromwell also constructed two affirmative and negative arguments on
an issue, but subjects were required to respond on a questionnaire
8'3
between the cammunications as well as after the last communication.
He fcund a significant recency effect.

Hovland and Mandell suggested

that a "formulation-commitment" dimension was present in the Land and
Knower studies, but absent in the Cromwell study.

The sublects

were forced to formulate an opinion or attitude based on the first
presentation in the Lund and Knower studies that was not changed
with much persuasion through the second speech.

From the basis of

81
Carl I. Hovland and V4allace Mandell, "Is there a Law of Primacy?"
pp. 13-22.
82
F. H. Lund, "The Psychology of Belief," pp. 183-191: F. H.
Knower, 'Experimental Studies of Changes in Attitudes. II. A Study
of the Effect of Printed Argument in Changes in Attitudes," JkSP
30 (1936): 522-532.
83
Cromwell, "First versus Second," pp. 105-122.
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their research, Hovland and Mandell concluded that "it appears unlikely
that merely expressing one's opinion on a questionnaire will sig84
nificantly influence one's subsequent opinion on an issue."
Hovland, Campbell, and Brock investigated a more intense form
85
of commitment to a position after hearing only one side of an issue.
Primacy effects were investigated among (a) subjects who were asked to
write their opinions for a publication to be read by their peers in
a magazine, and (b) control subjects who wrote their impressions
anonymously.

They concluded that "mere private commitment in terms

of filling out a questionnaire, does not appear to have any decisive
86
effect on any of the issues studied to date."

A subiect who considers

changing opinion after hearing a second communication may anticipate
!tame negative social reinforcement from his associates if they became
aware of his change.

when the change in attitude is anonymous, the

efrects are much less clear-cut.
Stone's research dealt with a more pragmatic use of affirmative-
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negative argument structure, namely that of the judicial system.
He predicted primacy in the judicial system.

As the prosecutor presents

the first stronp argument in the structure, it would seem that the
overall results would be biased in his favor.
the order of testLmony of trial material.

The experiment varied

Prior to reading strong
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Hovland and Mandell, "Is there a Law of Primacy?" pp. 13-22.
85
Carl I. Hovland, Enid H. Campbell, and Timothy Brock, "The
Effect of 'Commitment' on Opinion Change Following Communication," in
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Ibid., p. 31.
8Lrnon A. Stone, "A Primacy Effect in Decision-Making by
Jurors," JC 19 (September 1969): 239-247.

final evidence from the prosecutor, sixty-five university students
acting as jurors read statements that were identical in all respects,
except that they came from either prosecution first, defense second,
or defense first, prosecution second.
primacy effect.

Stone found a pronounced

Using the same experiments] design, however, Wallace

88
found opposing results--a pronounced recency effect.
Important here is that Stone's decision to gather tentative
commitments from the subjects during the procedure enabled him to
analyze the effect of premature commitment on final attitude change.
The results seemed to suggest that "premature commitment. . .
89
a possible biasing factor in a lury's trial."

They do not support

Hovland's premise that commitments must be made public to produce
concern.

In fact, data from Stone's study supported findings by

Bennet that private commitments are lust as effective as public
90
commitments in yielding a primacy effect.

"Need hrousal

Factors

Cohen suggested that information relevant to need satisfaction
when presented after strong needs have been aroused will be regarded
91
as more satisfying than information presented before need arousal.
88
William F. Wallace, "Primacy and Recency Warnings and Order
Effects in Persuasive Communications," (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Alabama, 1970).
89
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p. 246.

90Edith B. Bennet, "Discussion, Decision, Commitment, and
Concensus in 'Group Discussion'," Human Relations 8 (1955): 251-273.
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Authur B. Cohen, "Need for Cognition and Order of Communication
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The first situation would be expected to also produce greater acceptance
of the material.

The communication order of arousal-information,

in fact, did receive more acceptance of the communicator's conclusions
than the order of information-arousal.

It seems that the information-

arousal order was perceived as more ambiguous than the alternative
order, and was also perceived as "lacking in cognitive clarity and
92
reasonableness."
Moreover, the order of arousal-information was more effective
e influencing opinion for subjects with relatively weak desires
to understand, than for those of high cognitive need.

It was found

that sub,lects high in !:.
- ognitive need were influenced to about the same
extent regardless of information presented.

Conversely, low cognitive

need subjects tended to respond positively to the arousal-information
order

and negatively to the alternate order, information-arousal.

"immunizatiorC Factors
Stone attempted to induce resistance to the final appeal in
judicial procedings by introducing refutation to arruments not
93
yet presented by the prosecution.

The finding of a primacy effect

in the two approaches to immunization supports the theory that
protecting a belief by prior refutational immunization is more effective
than trying to restore the belief after it has been successfully
Again, however, VAllace, using the same experimental design,

attacked.

found that neither prior warnings nor the position of the warnings
92
Ibid., p. 93.

93

Stone, "Primacy in Decision-Making,"

p. 239-247.
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nad any significant influence on order effects.

Other researchers

have investiaated immunization, though their designs were not

95

structured to determine primacy-recency effects.

"Reinforcement" Factors
A reinforcement or conditioning hypothesis was initiated by
96
McGuire and later by Rosnow.

The ability of a researcher to predict

a primacy or recency effect may depend on his ability to locate
a rewarding or punishing situation in the communication context.
Lana concluded that it is problematic whether or not reward or punishment as reinforcers may be isolated as factors, as an individual
may be convinced of an argument in the face of opposition without

97

the presence of reward or punishment.

McGuire suggested that

a conditioning trial occurs when a subject's response is rewarded,
while an extinction trial occurs when no reward is given for the re98
sponse. His predictions are derived from Hull's learning theories.
McGuire argued that effects of a "source's earlier communications on the
94
Wallace, "Primacy and Recency Warnings."
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persuasiveness of his later messages depend in large measure on the
extent to which agreement with those earlier arguments was rewarding

99

for the recipient.

McGuire compared the two orders of messages

presented by a single communicator.

In one, conclusions consonant

with the motives and desires of the audience were presented first
with opposlng arguments following, and the other had the sequence
The conditioning theory maintained that when reinforcing

reversed.

messages are transmitted first there is a stronger conditioned
stimulus for eliciting responses that lead to the acceptance of the
position advocated (i.e., payirg attention to and learning from the
communicator's remarks).

Conversely, responses leading to nonacceptance

should be conditioned to the communicator who presents undesireable
messages first, as they are punishing.

His results supported the thesis.

Rosnow, unlike McGuire, was concerned with successive opposing
100
arguments in a single speech.

He felt that reinforcement before the

opposing arguments would yield primacy, and reinforcement after the
arguments would yield recency.

The results showed no consistent effect,

yielding McGuire's "conditioning" hypothesis somewhat tenable.

"Conflict-Avoidance" Factors
Janis and Feirabend presented the following hypothesis:
When opposing arguments have a very low probability of
being spontaneously salient for the audience, an authoritative
communication will be more effective if the con arguments are

99

McGuire, "Conditioning Responsiveness,"

pp. 99-114.

100Rosnow, "Opinion Change and Order of Presentation."

39
presented after, rather than before the major pro arguments.
That is, con arguments are expected to create less interference
with audience acceptance if given toward the end of ap lauthor"
itative communication rather than near the beginning.JThis suggests that pro arguments in a communication invoke
approach tendencies toward the communicator while the con arguments
invoke audience avoidance tendencies.

It should be noted that this

hypothesis is specifically formulated for nonsalient con arguments
(i.e., those which the audience has never heard before or remember
during the cammunication).

If, for instance, the con arguments

are made salient at the very beginning of a communication, the
recipients' avoidance motivation becames strong, increasing tne probability that the remainder of the cammunication will be ignored
or silently disputed.

The results of the study supported the tneory.

Investigation of Communicant and
Recipient Personality Variables
Few researchers have investigated the area of personality
variables on primacy-recency effects.

A summary of the most pertinent

studies follows.
Brown analyzed the effect of subjects' introversion-extroversion
102
tendencies, neuroticism, and degree of self-esteem on primacy-recency.
Her results uncovered no significant relationship between any of the
variables and order effects.
.
101
Irving L. Janis and Rosalind Feirabend, 'Effects of
Alternating Ways of Ordering Pro and Con Arguments in Persuasive
Communications," in Carl I. Hovland, ed., Order of Presentation, P- 117.
'Margaret Brawn, "The Relationship Between :',olme Personality
Variables and Primacy in Forming Personality Impressions," (Ph.D.
dissertation, State University of New York at Albany, 1973).
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Dodd sought a relationship between dogmatism and order effects
103
among a group of subjects classified low or high in dogmatism.
He found no significant relationship.

As a possible explanation he

surmised that in relation to other factors such as commitment and
assimilation, dogmatism appears a relatively unimportant characteristic.
Steininger and Eisenberg investigated the degree of dogmatism
and Machivellianism of subjects in relation to order effects.

None of

the ratings systematically correlated with order effects.
Yontef attempted to assess the effects of ego involvement
105
on the order of presentation.

Subjects were divided into high

and low involvement groups and subjected to two three hundred word
communications (either pro-con or con-pro) about aggressiveness and
submission.

Involved subjects were influenced by primacy, while less

involved subjects were responsive to recency.
Stern, Lana, and Pauling investigated the interaction of
subjects' self-esteem, degree of anxiety toward the communicaton and
relevance of topic.106

Their results suggested the following
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six hypotheses:

(1) With a relevant topic, subjects yielded to a

primay effect in all conditions.

(2) With a nonrelevant topic,

subjects yielded to a primacy effect when the neutral speech preceded
the fear arousing speech, and recency in the other order.

(3) Sub-

jects high in esteem yielded to a primacy effect when the neutral
speech preceded the fear arousing epeech, and to recency in the other
order.

(4)

Subjects low in self-esteem yielded to a primacy effect

when the fear arousing speech preceded the neutral speech, and a
recency effect when the neutral speech preceded the fear arousing
speech.

(5) Subjects with high anxiety showed primacy effects

when the neutral speech preceded the fear arousing speech, and a
recency effect when the fear arousing speech preceded the neutral
speech.

(6) Subjects low in anxiety yielded to a primacy effect

when the fear arousing speech preceded the neutral speech, and a recency
effect occurred when the neutral speech preceded the fear arousing
speech.
Ochs attempted to determine what effects age has on primacyrecency.107

With three hundred twenty subjects of differing ages

(9, 13, 17, 21, 70) he varied the presentation of communications
about a hypothetical boy being extroversive or introversive.
It was found that all subjects described the boy on the basis of the
first block of informatim.

The greater tendencies to describe the boy

lea ;t in terms of the first block of information occurred as an
increased function of age.

Primacy was stronger between the ages of

13 and 17 than between 17 and 21.
107
Leonard A. Ochs, "Primacy-Recency in Differing Age Groups,"
(Ph. D. dissertation, State University of New York at Albany, 1973).
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In the only study to assess order effects in relation to
communicator personality variables, Rosenbaum and Levin had subjects
respond to favorable and unfavorable statements about an imaginary
character presented in different orders by a highly credible source and
a source low in credibility.

Reliable recency effects were obtained.

Additionally, responses were shown to vary as a function of the credibility of the source.

Theyc.oncluded:

"Informational items of a

given value receive more weight when supplied by a highly credible
109
source than when supplied by a low credible source."
On the basis of existing research in personality characteristics of subjects it appears that dogmatism, Machivellianism,
neuroticism, and introversion-extroversion display little effect on
primacy or recency.

Increased age, ego involvement, self esteem,

anxiety, and message relevance does seem to influence order effects.
Certainly more research is called for in this area, replicating the
studies and incorporating other personality variables in the designs.

Investigation of Mode of Presentation
Cowen investigated the effects of written and film commun11U
ication in tne area of order effects in impression formation.
108
Milton E. Rosenbaum and Irwin P. Levin, "Lmpression Formation as a Function of Source Credibility and Order of Presentation of
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109
Ibid., p. 173.
110
Paul S. Cowen, "A Comparison of Film and Written Communications with Regard to Order Effects in Personality Impression
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Albany, 1973).
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Tt was disccvered that written communication often yielded primacy
and film communication created no effect.

When written and film

communication were combined, film elicited a greater response in either
ordinal position.

Rationale
as may be noted in the preceding review of literature, t.iere
exists no study which incorporated the following five variables
in one research design:

sex, dogmatism, and receivers' self esteem,

order of presentation, and message relevance as these differentially
affect attitude change and recall.

To this extent the current

research is justified.
Secondly, and to a lesser degree, studies which have analyzed
certain variables independently in tne context of persuasion have
reached conflicting results.

For example, the research of Crockett, and

Mayo and Crockett supported differences of response between cognitively
simple and cognitively complex subjects.

Later replications by

Supnick, and Leventhal and Singer failed to uncover differences.

This

discrepancy exists in other areas as well.
Finally, the present study is unique in the application of
statistical methods to assess relationships of the variables, as well
as statistical models to assess differences among the variables--the
normal procedure in order effects studies to date.

The application of

multiple correlation and regression analysis to the question of
order of presentation in persuasion will yield a regression equation
whereby predictions of attitude change and recall may be made from
knowledge of the presence or absence of the predictor variables.
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Summary
Jones and Berglas stated that

on an actuarial basis there

is no question that primacy effects are more common than recency
effects when subjects are forced to process inconsistent infor111
mation."

:Alch a conclusionary statement seems rather hasty in

light of the large body of conflicting results reviewed in this
chapter.

At best, one should admit with reserve that the evidence to

date is suite contradictory, and a mere plurality advantage cannot
serve to determine the most effective presentational order.

Indeed

iilson envisioned this when he noted that the primacy effect is an
112
easily nullified effect.
Certainly more systematic research is implied.

One possible

guide for future reference may be the model "Who says what to wham
113
with what effect?"
Only recently has research focused on same
factors at work during the communication process that may affect
primacy-recency, rather than attempting to prove a general law for
order effects.

Such research has focused on differing constituents of

the communication situation exemplified in the above question.

For

instance, Dodd, Steininger and Eisenberg, Brown, Yontef, and ochs have
focused on the recipient--the "wham" of the simple model--and certain
personality variables that may influence order effects.

Research

111
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112
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113
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to the 'Law of Primacy'?" JO 16 (1967): 201-207.
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has also attempted to analyze the effects of commitment on primacyrecency, as well as the audience's ability to remember or recall
statements of a communication.

Crockett's investigation concerned

subjects' cognitive complexity, while Schuitz's theoretical interpretation focused on the subjects' psychological activation.

Hovland

and Pritzker and others have applied the social judgement involvement
theory in their contrast-avoidance interpretation.

Anderson and

Jacobson have applied Festinger's dissonance theory to their discounting
interpretation.
Similarly, research has also focused on the communication-the "what" of the model--and variables such as interestingness of topic,
strength of argument, familiarity of topic, and consonant versus
dissonant information.

However, the list of communication bound or

message related variables studied to date is far from inclusive.
Surprisingly, research in the mode of presentation is severely
limited.

Rosnow argued that if attention to the communicator and

comprehension of the message are nessary conditions to be established
for opinion change, then the mode of presentation is a primary concern.11.

However, only two studies have analyzed differing effects of

various media presentations.

Cowen compared the effect of film and

written communications, while :aria compared the effect of live and
115
tape recorded presentations.

ubviously further research varying

the mode of presentation is implied.
114
hosnow, -ahabever Happened to Primacy?"

pp. 10-31.

115
Robert E. Lana, "Interest, Media, and Order Effects in
Persuasive Communications," JP 56 (1963): 9-13.

Similarly, there is a dearth cf research efforts focusing on
the communicator--the

who

of the model.

Janis and Feirabend

investigated the communicator's ability to introduce opposing arguments
to an audience to his best advantage.

Stone attempted to find the

best method to induce resistance to following communications througn
immunization.

Luchins and Wallace investigated the effect of state-

ments warning against order effects in an effort to minimize the
occurrance of primacy.

Wilson considered the presentational manner and

delivery aspects of a speaker, wnlle hosenbaum and Levin sought
the relationship of source credibility and order effects.
It is further imperative that researchers take the initiative
to broaden and expand the borders of order effects research in an
effort to strengthen the presently weak operational definition of
the concepts of primacy and recency by providing more absolute,
concrete, and exact predictive models.

On the other hand, replications

of all the studies included in this review are imperative to improve
or discredit the predictive accuracy of existing models.

CHAPTER II

RESEARCH '..UESTIONS, PROCEDURES, AND DATA ANALYSIS
The purpose of this chapter is to present the research
questions and describe the procedures for the study and method of
data analysis.

First, the chapter presents the research questions

and expected results.

The second section notes the procedures and

subjects employed in the study.

The third section explains the

statistical techniques applied to the research.

Research ,tuestions
This section sets forth the research questions developed from
issues raised in the preceding review of literature, and presents
the expected functional relationship of the selected independent
variables with the criterion variables.

The expected relationships

among the variables are based on observations of the results from
previous studies in the area.

Research .tiestion
How may certain personality and demographic variables affect
attitude change and recall in the general order effects paradigm?
First, in relation to self-esteem, it might be expected that the
individual of high self-esteem may have a greater tolerance for ambigudty
1
Aii data operations and statistical analyses cited in this
study were performed by appropriate computer techniques using SS.
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than the individual with low esteem

and may wait to hear both sides

of the issue before making a decision.

n the other hand, the

individual with low self-esteem may form an

arly attitude after

the first persuasive message and reject the latter, due to a low
tolerance for ambiguity, yielding a primacy effeot.
Moreover, Leventhal and Perloe have suggested that persons
with low self-esteem are more persuasible when the message is more
2
pessimistic, negative, and threatening in tone.

Thus, there may

be same relationship between low self-esteem and acceptance of a
con argent, regardless of order.
Secondly, to date no order effects study
effects of sex on attitude change and recall.

as assessed the

Perhaps this is due

to a commonly held belief that there is no cultural distinction
between male and female stereotypic responees to communication
messages which involve issues unrelated to the current sex superiority/
equality conflict.

Messages used in primacy-recency studies typically

avoid such issues to inhibit sex bias.

However, undefined differences

may be present when the sex factor is coupael with other variables
such that males low in self-esteem may have a greater tolerance for
ambiguity than females low in self-esteem, which would provide a
more pronounced primacy effect for the males.

Jr, perhaps males who

are highly dogmatic would tend to differ from highly dogmatic females.
Overall, however, there fs expected little systematic bias of sexspecific responses.

Howard Leventhal and S. I. Perloe, "A Relationship Between
Self-Esteem and Persuasibility," JAS? 64 (July 1962): 385-388.
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Finally, in relation to receiver dogmatism. Dodd found
that as dogmatism scores increased subjects tended to score lower
on attitude toward revenue sharing.
he stated:

As a speculative explanation

"As a general personality characteristic dogmatism may

accompany a negative bias 'set'.

Because they are more closed-minded,

highly dogmatic subjects may react negatively regardless of message
order."

3

As a self-criticism, however, he pointed out that the small

N size (40) may have accounted for the results, and suggested that
This researcher

further research should take this into account.

surmises that if there is a negative bias "set" among hirhly dogmatic
subjects it will manifest itself through the attitude and recall
measures.

Research 4uestion 2
How may topic relevance affect attitude change and recall in
the general order effects paradigm?

Generally this researcher

expects to find that as message relevance increases so wi..i receiver
interest and attention, regardless of sex, dogmatism, and self-esteem.
As was found in earlier studies using two-sided communications, a
general primacy effect is expected with high relevance and a recency
effect may occur with low relevance.

Research 4uestion 3
How may order of presentation affect attitude change and
recall in the general order effects paradigm?

In terms of a main

effect, prior research is unclear as to the direction of toe effect,
but differences in response are expected to occur on the basis of

'Dodd, "The Effects of Dogmatism,' p. JJ.
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the previously discussed variables.

Research .ixaestion

4

Is recall an adequate predictor of the persuasiveness of a
particular communication?

It is accepted by many that attitude

change differences induced as a function of attention and message
order are mediated by differences in retention of material.

In fact,

4
Miller and Campbell founded their predictive model on this premise.
If this relationship is sound, one would expect attituae change
scores to correlate highly with retention scores.

Research question 5
Cf the independent variables given, what combination predict
attitude change and recall?

The researcher is interested in examining

the linear relationship of the five independent variables with the
criterion variables of attitude change and recall.

It is expected

that a significant amount of the variation in attitude change and recall
can be explained by linear dependence upon dogmatiam, self-esteem,
sex, relevance of material, and order of presentation.

The statistical

technique employed to uncover relationships will be regression
analysis.

The analysis will yield an equation for the prediction

of attitude change and recall, as well as present rank orderings
of importance in the amount of variation explained by the variables.
4
It should be noted that although they presume the mediation
of retention on attitude change, their findings indicated very little
interrelationship. Similarly, Grano, "Primacy versus Recency,'
p. 94, found little interrelationship. Crano goes on to suggest
that the age-old isamorphimm of retention and attitude change
simply does not exist.
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Procedures

Creation of

peecnes

Speech topics for this experiment were derived from the
basic speech courses at Western Kentucky University.

One class of

approximately thirty students was asked to supply the researcher
with speech topics that were relevant and others which were irrelevant
to students enrolled in basic speech courses at Western.

Relevant

topics were defined as those which were interesting, controversial,
and familiar, while irrelevant topics were defined as those which
were not interesting, controversial, nor familiar.

From this collection

of topics a highly relevant and a highly irrelevant topic were
chosen by means of having two other c.Lasses rank each topic.

The

highly relevant topic concerned a co-educational dormatory policy
for Western, while the highly irrelevant topic concerned the national
policy of sunshine laws.

A two hundred word pro and a two hundred word

con essay were written about each topic in a 11,...nner that allowed
either essay to precede the other without affecting the flow of thought
so that each subject in the experiment would read a composite speech
of four hundred words in pro-con or con-pro order.

The content of

the speeches was factual in nature, included supporting evidence
balanced for both sides in terms of quantity and quality, and
evidentiary sources in all instances were omitted to control for the
variable of message authoritativeness which might have had a biasing
effect on the highly dogmatic subjects (see Appendix A).

To assure

equality among speeches twelve students in basic speech classes were
asked to read each speech and evaluate it on a semantic differential
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in terms of logic, clarity, factual bases, support evidence, emotionality
of language, and intensity of language.

Interjudge reliability

coefficients were then computed to assertain the correlation of
each speech with the others.

The results are recorded in Table 1.

Variables Studied

Dependent Variables
The Diab method of social judgement and ego-involvement was
selected as a basis for attitude measurement.

Subjects responded

on a nine point semantic differential type scale to three sets of
bipolar adlectives:
(see Appendix B).

good/bad, wise/foolish, and valuable/worthless

Rather than simply asking the subiects to indicate

their feelings toward the concept by marking the one position with
which they agree (the technique employed in the typical semantic
differential type scale), the subjects were asked to mark all the
positions they would be willing to accept, all the positions they
would be willing to reject, and all the positions about which they
had no commitment.

They were also instructed to circle the one

position with which they most agreed.

To simplify instructions,

percentage figures were placed under the nine points along the continuum such that the two end positions represented 100% good, wise,
and valuable, and 10101 bad, foolish, and worthless: the next two
positions toward the middle represented 75% good, wise, and valuable,
and 75% bad, foolish, and worthless: the next two positions, 50%:
the next two positions, 25%; and the remaining position in the middle
represented 0% good, wise, and valuable, and 0% bad, foolish, and
worthless.

The percentage figures also served two other functions:
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TABLE 1
PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
INTERJUDGE CORRELATIONS FOR SPEECHES

Pro
Co-ed Donn
Pro
Co-ed Dorm

Pro
Sunstane Law

Con
Sunshine Law

N-12

Pro
Sunshine Lew

Con
Sunshine Law

1.0000
p

Con
Co-ed Dorm

Con
Co-ed Dora

)

-0.6219
(P=40.037)

1.0000
(v*****)

0.8578
(pA).002)

-0.6787
(p=0.022)

1.0000
4)
(p

-40.6664
(p=0.025)

0.6878
(p=0.020)

-0.7875
(p=0.006)

1.0000
(p_** m)
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It allowed for more extreme positive or negative attitudes since one
may have indicated his opinion that the concepts were 100% good,
wise, and valuable, or 100% bad, foolish, and worthless, as well
as increased the presumption of interval level data, as the distance
between any two points along the continuum appears equal to the distance
between any other two points along the continuum.

The scales were

identical for both the pre- and posttest attitude measures.
A number of procedures were used to index subjects
A description of the operationalizations follows.

attitudes.

The first procedure

concerned the one position with which the subjects most agreed.
The average of the scale values for tne three positions (one from
each continuum) was computed for each subject yielding the subjects'
attitude on the pre- and posttests as is typically done in semantic
differential scales.

Changes from the pre- to posttest were noted

by subtracting the posttest score from the pretest score.
Secondly, the researcher was concerned with the simple frequency of response (i.e., the number of acceptable positions, rejection
positions, and noncammitment positions),.

Changes in frequency were

determined by subtracting the pretest frequency for each type of
response from the frequency of posttest responses.

It should be

noted that since the subjects were asked to respond on each position
on the continua (twenty-seven positions in ail), a change after the
manipulation in any one domain (acceptance, rejection, noncammitment)
subsequently affected changes in the other domains.

For example,

if on the pretest a subject rejected eight positions out of the twentyseven possible, and on the posttest relected only four positions, the
number of acceptable and/or noncammitment positions had to increase to
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account for the extra four spaces so generated.
.
Thirdly, the researcher was concerned with the average .lcceptance, rejection, and noncommitment position across all three scales.
The scale values for every response in any one domain were added
and the sum was divided by the frequency of responses for that domain.
The results yielded the average position with which the subjects
agreed, the average position which they rejected, and the average
position with which they had no commitment.

The average acceptance

position produced similar scores to the single position with which
they agreed most.

Changes in attitude were determined by subtracting

the pretest averages from the posttest averages.

This averaging of

latitt_des yielded a clearer measurement of subjects' attitudes
than can be expected from having the subjects indicate the one position
with which they agreed most.

The latter, for instance, assumes that

a subject's attutude may fail at one point along the continuum, while
the former assumes attitude to be a range of points along the continuum with establishable boundaries of tolerance for the concept
above which one is unwilling to accept (or reject) more, and below
which one is unwilling to accept (or reject) more.

This approach

seemed to deal more with the question "How much are you willing to
agree that the concepts are good/bad, wise/foolish, and valuable/
worthless?" than the typical semantic differential type approach.
Also, in the typical approach subjects who respond similarly on
moderate or neutral positions may not have similar or identical
meanings of the concept.

Some may have had a neutral stand in which

they were willing to accept that the concepts had same merit, while
others may have had identical neutral positions, yet were willing to
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accept that the concept had little merit.

Only the method employed

in this study adequately differentiated between subjects' neutral
positions.

Finally, the use of nine points rather than the tra-

ditional seven allowed for greater differentiation in sublects'
attitudes as it offered them a wider range of possible attitude
distinctions.
The Diab method has not been

extensively used in cammuni-

ication research to date, due in part, perhaps to its recent inception.5
However, both camparitive studies indicating a high degree of correlation between it and other measurement techniques, and the explicit
advantages of the system, are rapidly drawing advocates.6
To assess the effect of order of presentation, dogmatiam,
esteem, sex, ano message relevance on recall a six-item multiple
choice questionnaire was constructed fram the content of the material.
Three questions were taken fram the pro and three were taken from the
con argument (see Appendix C).

The number of correct responses served

5
The technique was first mentioned by Lutfy N. Diab in "Some
Limitations of Existing Scales in the Measurement of Social Attitudes,
Psychological Reports 17 (1965): 427-430. Diab first reported the
use of the technique in "Studies in Social Attitudes: III. Attitude
Assessment Through the Semantic Differential Technique," JSP 57 (1965):
303-314. The procedure has also been used in the following studies:
David Mortensen and Kenneth K. Sereno, "Ego-Involvement and Discrepancy on Perceptions of Communications," SM 37 (1970): 127-134;
Kenneth K. Sereno and David C. Mortensen, "The Effects of Ego-Involved
Attitudes on Conflict Negotiation in Dyads," SM 36 (1969): 8-12;
Kenneth K. Sereno and Edward Bodakin, "Ego-Involvement and Attitude
Change: Toward a Reconceptualization of Persuasive Effect," SM
39 (1972): 151-158. See also Margaret L. McLaughlin and Heather
Sharman, "A Scalar Distance Model for the Measurement of Latitudes of
Acceptance, Rejection, and Noncammitment," SM 39 (1972): 302-305:
and Kenneth K. Sereno, "Ego-Involvement: A Neglected Variable in
4eech Communication Research," AJS 55 (1.969): 69-77.
6
James C. McCroskey, "Latitudes of Acceptance and the
Semantic Differential," JSP 74 (1968): 127-132.
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as an index of the amount of material recalled.

Independent Variables
In 1965 Rokeach presented a forty-item scale to measure

7

general authoritarianism or closed-imindedness.

Since then, numerous

investigators have advancea shorter scales to measure closed-mindedness
or dogmatism.

tine such scale is the twenty-item short scale developed
8
by Troldahl and Powell in 1965.
They reported an interitem reliability of .84 for the original forty-item scale of Fokeach.
From tnis scale shortened scales were developed from the best ten,
fifteen, and twenty items.

The following reliability coefficients were

approximatea for eacn version of the scale:
4y-item
20-item
15-item
10-item

scale
scale
scale
scale

.64

.79
.73
.66

To determine the validity of the construct measures, each
scale was then correlated with the original forty-item scale using
two !samples.

The following results were obtained:
Sample 1

20-item vs. 40-item score
15-item vs. 40-item score
10-item vs. 40-item score

Sample 2

.95

.94

.91
.88

.73

.79

For the purpose of this study ten items from the fifteen
item scale were selected on the basis of the following criteria:
7
Milton Rokeach, "Political and Religious Dogmatism: An
Alternative to the Authoritarian Personality," Psychological Monegraph
43 (1956): p. 70.
8V. C. Troldahl and F. A. Powell, "A Short-Form Dogmatism
Scale for use in Field Studies," Social Forces 44 (1965): 211-214.
See also John F. Robinson and Phillip R. :;haver, Measures of Social
i-sycholosical Attitudes (Ann Arbor: Institute for 6ocial heseardh,
1973), PP. 43.3-435.
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(1) Each item selected must have had an item-total score correlation
of above

.4)

from the Troldahl and Powell results, and (41) items

must not blatantly refe: to religious or political values (see
Appendix D).

The items were then applied to a Likert-type format

in which each subject indicated the degree of argreement with each
statement.
was .58.

The alpha level attained for the ten-item scale so created

From this ten-item scale, a six-item scale was developed

with an alpha of .63.

Subjects high in dogmatism were differentiated

from subjects low in dogmatism by a median split on thc basis of
this six-item scale.
To assess sublects

degree of self-esteem a ten-item semantic

differertial was composed of items selected from a number of existing
scales (see Appendix E).

As a very general index of the validity

of such a scale, a pilot test group of basic speech students (T4'25)
completed the scale and their scores were correlated with scores
generated fram their instructor's estimation of the degree of esteem
each subject had.

The validity coefficient attained was .53 (P-.u0)).

The interitem reliability of the ten-item scale for the pilot test
group was .81 (p<.05), while the interitem reliability among experimental subjects was .70 (p(.05).

Data Collection
The administration of tne experiment took approximately
twenty-five minutes.

Subjects were 196 students in several basic

9
Robinson and Shaver, Measures, pp. 7;)-118. The items were
taken from scales previously devised by Janis and Field, pp. 76-8);
Rosenberg, pp. 81-83: Coopersmith, pp. 84-87: Berger and Phillips,
pp. 107-112; and Worchel, pp. 113-118.

i0
speech courses at Western.

Tht• matiai was randomly distributed

to the subjects in booklet form, and subjects were asked to wait
for further instructions.

Subjects were then given a specific amount

of time to complete each section in the booklet, the sections
being (in order) the dogmatism scale, the esteem scale, the pretest
attitude measure, the message, the recall questionnaire, and the
posttest attitude measure.

The experimenter answered no questions

which referred to the content of the material or nature of the
experiment.

Informal questioning after the sessions increased the

experimenter's confidence that the topics were highly relevant and
irrelevant.

For instance, when asked, -Some of you received speeches

dealing with co-ed dorms, and others received speeches dealing with
sunshine laws.

Were the topics relevant to you?", one male responded,

"Though I am strongly against co-ed dorm policies, I could care less
about sunshine laws."

Some who received the co-ed dorm speech

asked, 'What. are sunshine iaws?-

Others suggested, "Sunshine laws

are not really pertinent to us, whereas co-ed dorm policies are."

Data Analysis
The data were subjected to a number of statistical procedures
to determine differences and relationships.

First, ten three-way

analyses of variance were camputed to determine main and interaction
effects.

The analyses represented all possible two-way and three-

way interactions.

F ratios with significant differences were then

10
The actual sample, after attrition, was 165. Subjects
were selected in the sample only if a major portion of all of the
items from each section in the booklet was completed. In instances
of the omission of a few items, the absent responses were coded
as missing data.
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subjected to the t-test for differences among several means, a post11
hoc multiple comparison test.
The data were also subjected to multiple correlation and
regression analysis.

The criterion variables were attitude change

and recall, with dogmatism, sex, self-esteem, relevance of topic,
and order of presentation serving as independent variables.

The

predictor variables were brought into the equation stepwise from the
best to the worst.

That is, the variable that explained the greatest

amount of variation in attitude and recall was entered first, the
variable that explained the greatest amount in conjunction with the
first was entered second, and so on.

The criteria for selecting

variables included in the equation placed little restriction on the
stepwise regression.

Specifically, a variable was entered if its

F ratio (computed in its test of significance for the regression
coefficient) was greater than .01, and the tolerance (the proportion
of the variance of that variable not explained by the independent
variables already in the equation) exceeded .001.

This meant that

"a variable may be entered if the proportion of its variance not
12
explained by the other variables merely exceeds 0.1 percent."
Finally, cases with missing values were automatically eliminated
from all calculations through listwise deletion, which meant that
a case was eliminated if that case contained a missing value for
any of the five independent variables.

In sum, variables were

excluded from the equation if they failed to contribute to the
11
James L. Bruning and B. L. Kintz, Computational Handbook
of Statistics (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman, and Co.,
1968), pp. 112-114.
12

Norman H. Nie et al., Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences, 2nd ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), p. 346.

6i
overall explanation.

rt5

d

consequence, same equations incorporated

all five variables, while others incorporated any four.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS
The purpose of this chapter is to report the results of the
experimental manipulation.

To facilitate the report the data are

presented in terms of the research questions from chapter two.

Research .1.1estion 1
How may certain personality and demographic characteristics
(i.e., receivers' sex, dogmatism, and self-esteem) affect attitude
change and recall in the general order effects paradigm?

Attitude Change
One significant interaction effect surfaced in terms of the
frequency of acceptance.

This effect concerned a specific sex dif-

ference such that females high in dogmatism and esteem responded
with more acceptance positionF on the posttest than on the pretest,
while males high in dogmatism and esteem responded with fewer acceptance positions on the posttest than the pretest (2.0 campared with
-.30, p=.054).

It appears that females high in dogmatism and esteem

shifted opinion to a greater degree than males high in dogmatism and
esteem (see tables 2 and 3).
In terms of the average acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment
positions, two significant three-way interactions were uncovered.
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TABLE 2
ANALYSIS 07 VARIANCE:
FREQUENCY OF ACCEPTANCE POSITION CHANCE SCOFES LY
ESTEEM x DOGRATMM x SEX

-ource of Variat'or.
Main Effects
Esteem
Dogmatism
Sex

Significance
of F

Mean

Sum of
Squares

0.002
0.503
9.254

1
1
1

0.002
0.503
9.24.5

0.000
0.058
0.893

0.998
0.810
0.345

2447 Interactions
Esteem x Dogmatism
Esteer, x Sex
Dogmatism x Sex

0.299
0.173
12.384

1
1
1

0.299
0.173
12.384

0.029
0.017
1.197

0.865
0.857
0.275

34;av Interactions
Esteem x Dogmatism A Sex

38.994

1

38.994

3.758

0.054

Explained

52.029

1

8.851

0.456

0.543

Fesidual

1593.75

154

10.349

Total

1555.79

161

10.284
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TABLE 3
CCEPAEISON OF GROUF MEANS:
FREQUENCY OF ACCEPTANCE FOSITION CHANGE SCJEES BY
ESTFFM x DOGMATISM x SEX
Male

Low
Esteer

.40

(2o)

Female

1.33

(1R)

Change Score
N size

Low
i)ogjaatisn
High
Lsteem

1.36

Low
Esteem

.77

.75

(22)

(16)

Change Score
N size

High
Esteem

-.30a

2.00a
(15)

Change score
N size

(22)

.32

(29)

Change score
N size

High
LogmatisL,
(20)

common subscripts are significantly different, p.05.
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Tables 4 and 5 indicate the significant differences present in the
interaction of esteem, sex, and order in changes of the average
acceptance position.

Tables 6 and 7 indicate the significant dif-

ferences present in the interaction of esteem, sex, and order in
changes in the average rejection position.

In examining the two

interaction effeets a number of similarites are found.

These

similarities serve to increse the assurance of significance, as the
effects tend to take on a pattern in which changes in one domain
affect changes in the others.

As would be expected, increases in

the average acceptance position generally coincided with (cr perhaps
stimulated) increases in the average rejection position.

Similarly,

decreases in the average acceptance position also coincided with
decreases in the average rejection position.
Specifically, females low in esteem in the con-pro condition
increased their attitudes toward the topic (as may be seen in the
increase in the average acceptance position and rejection position in
tables 5 and 7) to a greater degree than females high in esteem
in the same con-pro condition.

The direction of the change suggests a

recency effect in that the females low in esteem were persuaded
more by the last argument (in this instance the pro).

This same

finding suggests a similar primacy effect for females high in esteem
in the con-pro order, as they were more persuaded by the first
argument (con).

The finding of a recency effect for females low

in esteem in the con-pro order and a primacy effect for females
high in esteem in the con-pro order was further strengthened by
corresponding responses of females high and low in esteem in the
alternate pro-con order.

As before, females low in esteem responded

TABLE 4
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE:
AVEEAGE ACCEPTANCE POSITION CHANGE 5021.2. BY
ORDER x ESTEEM x SEX

I
Mean
Square

Sum of
Squares

Source of Variation
Mair. Effects
Order
Esteem

!

F

iSignificance
of F

1
1
1

3.717
0.002
1.77'

2.247
0.001
1.075

0.136
0.972
0.301

1
1

2.00+2
0.563
0.276

1.234
0.340
0.157

0.258
0.561
0.683

15.58

1

15.584

9.423

0.003

23.841

7

3.'.05

2.059

0.051

ficsidual

254.585

154

1.554

Total

278.526

151

1.730

3.717
0.002
1.777

2-4,ay Interactions
jrder x Esteem
Order x Sex
Esteem x Sex
34:a7 Interactions
Order x Esteeem
Explained.

2.042
0.563
0.276

Sex

1

0%
0%
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TABLE

5

COMPAFISCC 3F GROUP MEANS:
AVERAGE ACCEPTAKE POSITION CHANGE SCCEES BY
CFDER x ESTEEN x SEX
Male

Female

Low
Esteem

.13
(19)

High
Esteem

(22)

(27)

Change Score
N size

Low
Esteem

.19
(23)

.93bce
(20)

Change Score
N size

High
Esteem

(20)

Change Score
N size

Pro-Con
Order

.584

Con-Fro
Order
-.05e
(1'7)

Change Score
N size

Means with common subscripts are significantly different, p-.003.

TABLE 6
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE:
AVERAGE REJECTION POSITION CHANGE SCORE BY
ORDEF x ESTEEM x SEX

Mean
Square

Significance
of F

Sum of
Squares

df

Main Effects
Order
Esteem
Sex

4.264
0.501
0.278

1
1
1

4.264
0.501
0.278

2.567
0.302
0.168

0.111
0.583
0.682

2-ay Interactions
Order x Esteem
Order x Sex
Esteem x Sex

4.022
0.502
0.148

1
1
1

4.022
0.502
0.148

2.429
0.303
0.039

0.121
0.583
0.765

12.700

1

12.700

7.372

0.006

Explained

22.163

7

3.166

1.913

0.071

Fesidual

254.941

154

1.655

Total

277.104

161

1.721

Source of Tariatiln

ay Interactions
)rder x Esteem x Sex

F
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TABLE 7
COMPARISON OF GFDUP MEANS:
A;EFACE REJECTION POSITION CHANGE SCORES BY
ORDEF. x ESTEEM x SEX
Male

Female

T ow
Esteen

.15
(19)

-.30abd
(14)

High
Esteem

.09c
(22)

(27)

Chanre Score
N size

Low
Esteen.

.38
(23)

.92bce
(20)

Change Score
N size

High
Esteem

.75d
(20)

•04e
(17)

Change Score
N size

Change score
N size

Fro-Con
Order

•

Con-Fro
Order

Means with common subscripts are significantly different, p=.006.
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in the direction of the argument presented last, while females
high in esteem responded in favor of the argument presented first.
The results of these interaction effects offer same interesting
insights.

A clear advantage exists for the argument presented first

among a group of females high in esteem, while the argument presented
iast has a similar effectiveness among a group of fema,.es low in
esteem.

Simply stated, females high in esteem respond to a primacy

effect, while females low in esteem respond to a recency effect.
By contrast, only m4..-s h:':gh in esteem receiving a con-pro
message showed any significant difference when compared with other
cells.

Since this pattern alMOTIR males was not substantiated in

any other message condition, it appears that this statistical
significance holds little conceptual meaning for the question of
the order by 3ex by esteem relationship.

He call
In terms of amount of material recalled, two effects were
noted.

First, analysis revealed a main effect such that subjects

low in dogmatism recalled more than subjects high in dogmatism,
as may be seen in tables 8 ana 9.

While subjects low in dogmatism

in general recalled more than subjects high in dogmatism, a sex
by dogmatism interaction specifically revealed that males low in
aogmatism recalled significantly more than males high in dogmatism
(.74 compared with 2.93, P--=-03).
tables 8 and 10.

These -esults are recorded in

TABLE 8
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE:
AMOUNT OF MATERIAL RECALLED 5Y
RELEVANCE x DOGMATISN x SEX

Source of Variation

Sum of
Squares

Main Effects
Relevance
Dogmatism
Sex

10.199
S.205
0.344

1
1
1

10.199
5.205
0.344

6.723
4.09.0
0.227

0.010
0.045
0.534

24:ay Interactions
'relevance x Dogmatism
Relevance x Sex
Dogmatism x Sex

0.348
0.071
7.250

1
1
1

0.348
0.071
7.250

0.229
0.047
1..779

0.33
0.829
0.030

3-ay Interactions
Relevance xDogmatism x Sex

2.004

1

2.004

1.321

0.252

27.312

7

3.902

2.572

0.016

.x.plained
Residual
Total

df

i233.524

154

250.937

161

Mean
Square

1.621

F

Lagnificance
of F

TABLE 9

Irrelevant

MAIN EFFECTS

Frequency of
kcceptance Position
Change Scores
Frequency of
Rejection Position
Change Scores
Frequency of
Noncammitment Position
Change Scores
Average
Acceptance Position
Change Scores
Average
Rejection Position
Change Scores

E.Icail

0

0

a.
c.:
f

a
.25
1.40
(81) (81)
.
b
.04
1.77
(81) (81)
.
-.33

c
-3.19

(81)

(81)

-.05
(81)

c
.61
(81)

.04
(81)

3.02

(81)

r
I
.

1

a,
-2.16

.93

(81)

(81)

4

1

,
I

c
.72
(81)
,
1

b
3.54

1
a
3.07

3.46 1
(81) (81)

01)
1

K.)

*
ALL these reported main effet means are significant: a = p <.05, b = p <.01, c = p <.001.
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TABLE 10
COMPARISON OF GROUP MEANS:
AMOUNT OF MATERIAL RECALLED BY
DOGMATISM x CEX
Male

Female

Low
Dogmatism

(42)

High
DogmatisL,

2.93a

3.2S

(42)

(31)

3.74a

3.21
(47)

Recall Scores

n size

Recall Ccores
N size

Means with common subscripts are significantly different, p=.03.
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Research .4uestion 2
How may topic relevance affect attitude change and recall
in the general order effects paradirm?

Attitude Change
Perhaps the most pervasive effect discovered in this study
concerned message relevance.

In terms of the frequency of acceptance,

rejection, and noncammitment positions, the main effect of message
relevance surface

in every three-way analysis of variance that

incorporated message relevance as a variable.

As tables 9, 11, 12,

and 23 illustrate, the irrelevant topic produced a higher frequency of acceptance and rejectin positions on the posttest than
the pretest than the relevant topic.

It also produced a lower fre-

quency of noncammitment positions on the posttest than the pretest
than the relevant topic.

This result would suggest a broadening

of the latitudes of acceptance and rejection, and a subsequent
narrowing of the latitude of noncummitment.

Tables 91

i4,

and 15

reveal that the subjects also increased the scale values for their
average acceptance and rejection positions more in the irrelevant
condition than in the relevant condition.

This indicates that the

subjects were refining their attitudes by accepting more on the good,
wise, and valuable end of the continuum and rejecting more on the bad,
foolish, and worthless end.
Tables 16 and 17 indicate that an interaction of relevance and
order was operative such that subjects who received the irrelevant
topic in con-pro order tended to increase the frequency of rejection
responses more than subjects in all other conditions.

Moreover,

TABLE 11
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE:
FEEVENCY OF ACOLPTANCE POSITICN CHANGE SCORE BY
RELLVANCE x ESMEM x SEX

1Significance
of F

Mean
Square

Sum of
Squares

di

59.131
0.541
14.599

1
1
1

59.131
0.541
14.699

0.053

0.017
0.81e

1.437

0.232

2-"ay Interactions
Relevance x Esteem
Relevance x Sex
Isteem x Sex

0.083
1.871
C.422

1
1

0.083
1.871
0./.22

0.008
0.113
0.01

0.922
0.67C
0.83S

3-.:ay Interactions
Relevance x Estem x Sex

5.228

1

9.228

0.902

0.34L

Explained

80.432

7

11.490

1.123

0.351

Residual

1575.351

154

10.230

Total.

1555.79?

161

10.234

Source of Variation
Main Effects
Relevarce
Esteem
Sex

.

5.780

TALLE 12
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE:
FREQUENCY OF REJECTION POSITION CHANCE SCORES BY
ESTEEM x RELEVANCE x sEa

Source of Variation
Main Effects
Relevance
Esteem
Q4
,

2-:ay Interactions
Relevance x Esteem
Relevance x Sex
Esteem x 2ex

Sum of
Squares

13/-020
2.801
27.166

dl'

r7ignifiCance
of F

Mean
Square

1 !13/4.020 10.076
1 1
2.801
0.211
1
27.16o
2.042

0.002
0.647
0.155

1

3.159

0.237

0.039

1
1

37.712
0.039

2.135
0.303

0.627
0.094
0.957

3.783

1

3.783

0.284

0.5S5

Explained

198.100

7

28.300

2.128

0.044

Residual

2048.303

154

13.301

Total

22'4.5.403

151 1 13.953

3447 Interactions
Relevance x Esteem x Sex

3.159
37.712

CP,

TABLE, 13
ANALYSIS OF VAhIANCE:
FREZENCY OF NONC.,MMITEENT POSITION CHANGE 3CJILS BY
kELOIAN,:E x ESTEEM x SEX

Source of Variation
Main Effects
Relevance
Esteem
Sex
2-Way Interactions
Relevance x Esteem
1.elevance x Sex
Esteem x Sex

Sum of
Squares

362.810
2.99:
82.542

df

1
1

Mean
Square

F

362.810 11.630
0.096
2.993
82.542
2.646

!significance
of F

0.001
0.757
0.106

2./480
61.950
1.667

1
1

2.480
61.950
1.667

0.079
1.986
0.053

0.778
0.151
0.817

0.325

1

0.325

0.010

0.919

Explained

483.145

7

69.021

2.212

0.036

Residual

. 4804.379

154

31.197

5287.523

141

32.842

3-av Interactions
Relevance x Esteem x Sex

Total

TABLE 14
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE:
AVERAGE ACCEPTANCE POSITION CHANGE SCORES BY
RELEVANCE x ESTEEM x DOGMATISM

Significance
o'

Sum of I
Squares
df

1
Mean
S uare

17.311
1.952

1

17.311

1

1.952

1.183 0.278

0.022

1

0.022

0.014 0.907

24477 Interactions
Relevance x Dogmatism
Relevance x Esteem
Esteem x Dogmatism

0.455
0.063
1.957

1
1
1

0.455
0.063
1.957

0.257 0.500
0.038 0.8e)
1.187 0.278

3-Vav Interactions
Relevance x Dogmatism x Estem

2.741

.a.

2.741

1.562 0.199

Explained

24.564

'7

3.509

2.128 0.01,L

Residual

253.952

15L

1.6,9

Total

278.526

161

1.730

Source of Variation
Main Effects
Relevance
Dogmatism
Esteem

F

10.479 0.0C1

co

TABLE 15
ANALYSIS SF VARIANCE:
AVERAGE REJECTISN POSITION CHANGE SCOPES BY
RELEVANCE x DOGMATISM x ESTEEM

Sum of
Squares

df

18.837
2.009
0.557

1
1
1

0.979
0.155
4.713

1
1
1

2.875

Explained

Source of Variation
Main Effects
Relevance
Dogmatism
Esteem

Mean
1
Square_L

Significance
of F

18.837 11.734
2.009
1.252
0.557
0.359

0.0C1
0.265
0.550

0.979
0.156
4.713

0.510
0.103
2.935

0.!,3S
0.7/49
0.0E9

1

2.875

1.791

0.183

29.893

7

L..270

2.550

0.013

Residual

247.211

15!.

1.505

Total

277.104

151

1.721

2-Va7 Interactions
Relevance x Dogmatism
Relevance x Esteem
Dogmatism x Esteem
Interactions
Relevance x Dogmatism Y Esteem

•13

TABLE 16
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE:
FREQUENCY OF FEJECTION POSITION CHANCE SCCEES BY
OLDEF A RELEVANCE x ESTEEM

Source of Variation
Main 7ffects
Order
iLelevance
Z,steem

Sum of
Squares

df

Mean
Square !

F

Significance
of F

1

34.11.7 2.530
122.589 9.441
7.430 0.572

0.107
0.003
0.451

48.657
19.378
9.954

1
1
1

48.657 3.747
19.378 1.492
9.954 0.767

0.055

8.501

1

8.501 0.655

0.420

Explained

245.767

7

35.252 2.715

0.011

Residual

1999.635

154

12.985

Total

2245.403

161

13.953

2-'.ay Interactions
Order x Relevance
Order x Esteem
Relevance x Esteem
3.4.av Interactions
Order x relevance x :steer

34.147
122.589
7.430

1

0.224
0.383

8
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TABLE 17
COMPARISON OF GROUP ME4N3:
FREQUENCY OF REJECTION POSITIONS CHANGE SCCEES BY
PDEF x F7L.ZikNCE
Fro-Con
Order

Con-Pro
Order

Relevant
Topic

(:4:)

.771.)
(40)

Change Score
N size

Irrelevant
Topic

(39)

2.73abc
(41)

Change score
N size

Means with common subscripts are significantly different, P22 .054.
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tables 18 and 19 reveal that these same subjects also increased
their average acceptance position to a greater degree than subjects
in all other conditions.
In sum, the results indicate (1) the irrelevant topic induced
more agreement than the relevant topic, (2) especially among subjects
in the con-pro irrelevant condition.

Recall
As in attitude change, meesage relevance surfaced in every
three-way analysis of variance that incorporated it as a variable.
As tables 8 and 9 depict, subjects recalled more material in the
irrelevant condition than in the relevant condition (3.54 compared
with 3.02, p<.01).

Research question 3
How may order of presentation affect attitude change and
recall in the general order effects paradigm?

Attitude Change
In terms of changes in the frequency of noncommitment positions,
a difference was evident between the two presentational orders.
The con-pro order was more successful than the alternative pro-con
order in eliciting significantly fewer noncommitment positions on
the posttest than the pretest (see tables 9 and a)).

Moreover,

when order was coupled with relevance, the con-pro irrelevant condition
produced more rejection positions than did all other conditions on
the posttest than the pretest (see tables 16 and 17).

TABLE 18
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE:
An-FACE ACCEPTIMOE POSITION CHANGE SCOLES BY
ORDEE x RELEVANCE x SEX

Source of Variation

Sum of
S uares

f

Mean
S.uare

Main Effects
Order
Relevance
Sex

3.416
18.413
3.071

1
1
1

3.416
18.413
3.071

2.130
11.483
1.915

0.415
0.0C1
0.168

2-Vay Interactions
Order x Relevance
Order x Sex
Relevance x Sex

6.024
0.949
0.385

1
1
1

6.024
0.949
0.385

3.755
0.592
0.240

0.054
0.443
0.525

j-Way Interactions
Drder x Relevance x Sex

0.050

1

0.050

0.031

0.860

31.586

7

.512

2.114

0.009

Lxplaind
Resu:3ual
Total

246.940

154

1.604

278.525

161

1.730

Significance
e"f F

A

a
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TAELE 19
OJRFARISON OF GROUP 14LANS:
AVI, RAGE &CC:FIANCE PaSITION CHANGE 5C0kES EY
ORDER x RELEVANCE
Pro-Con
Order

Con-Pro
Order

Relevant
Topic

Irrelevant
Topic

-.12

.25b
(40)

Change Score
N size

- 9;3abc

Change .
-,core
N size

(U)

(34
1

Means with common subscripts are significantly different,, p.054.

TABLE 20
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE:
FREQUENCY OF NONCOMMITMENT POSITION CHANGE SCORES BY
ORDEF x ESTEEM x SEX

Source of Variation
Main Effects
Order
Esteem
Sex

Sum of
Squares

df

Significance
of F

Mean
Square

123.28/,
2.055
58.735

1

123.284
2.055
58.735

3.797
0.053
1.309

0.053
0.802
0.181

2-way Interactions
Order x Esteem
Order x Sex
Esteem x Sex

50.780
12.895
0.200

1
1
1

50.780
12.895
0.200

1.551.
0.397
0.005

0.213
0.529
0.937

3-Wa7 Interactions
Order x Esteem x Sex

43.547

1

43.547

1.3t1

0.249

Lxplained

287.797

7

41.114

1.255

0.271

Fesiduai

4999.727

15!.

32./3

Total

5287.523

151

32.842

CO
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In terms of the average acceptance, rejection, and noncammitment positions, order was found to interact with relevance
(as previously explained in research question 2) such that subjects
who received the irrelevant topic in the con-pro order responded
more positively than did subjects in all other conditions.

Also,

an interaction of order by esteem by sex produced a recency effect
.)r females low in esteem, and a primacy effect for females high
in esteem (see tables 4 through 7).

Recall
No significant differences occurred for order as it affects
recall.

Research ',4uestion
Is recall an adequate predictor of the persuasiveness of a
particular communication?

Classical attitude theorists have for

years argued for what Crano termed the simple isomorphism of retention
and attitude.

The principle is that with two persuasive messages,

the one more remembered will be the more persuasive.

Were this

true one would expect attitude change scores to correlate positively
with recall scores.

The data do not confirm this expectation, as

may be seen in table 21.

None of the correlation coefficients

reached the critical level necessary for significance.

This suggests

that it is possible for a persuasive message to nave its desired
persuasive impact while not stimulating a great degree of retention.

TABLE 21
PEARSON r CORRELATION COEFFICI:NTS:
ATTITUDE MEASURh AND RECALL MEASURE
SCORE CORRELATIONS
Attitude Measure

Pearson r

Most Accepable Position
Change score

-0.005S
(130.472)

Frequency of Acceptance
Position Change Score

0.12;
(p=0.05.)

Frequency of Rejection
Position Change Score

0.0112

Frequency of Nonccianitment
Position Change Score

-0.0801
(p=0.15-S)

Average Acceptance
Position Change Score

0.0873
(p=0.135)

Average Rejection
rosition Change Score

0.1351
(1)=0.043)

Average Noncommitment
Position Change .-)core

0.0329
(1)=).339)
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hesearch .0.1e5tion
Of the independent variables given, what combination predict
attitude change and recall?

'Multiple regression is a general statis-

tical technique through which one can analyze the relationship
between a dependent or criterion variable and a set of independent
1
or predictor variables."

In this analysis the technique was used

as an inferential tool by which predictions of relationships in the
population may be made from sample data.

The general form of the

regression is Tf= A + B1X1 + 82X2 + B3X3 +. . .B1cXk, where Y' is
the estimated value for 7, A is the Y intercept, and B. are the
regression coefficients.
Specifically, the research question concerned the strength
of dependence or amount of variation in attitude change and recall
that can be expected by linear dependence upon the five predictor
variables operating jointly.

It was presumed that attitude change and

recall were linearly related to the predictor variables in such a manner
as to allow prediction on the basis of knowledge of the presence
or absence of the predictor variables.
The results of this analysis are reported in tables 22 through
The data indicate a relatively small predictive capacity on the
basis of the five predictor variables.
Multiple h and R
combination.

The tables present the

for the individual variables and variables in

In terms of frequency of respon3e, the variables in

combination account for 5.5% of the variation in frequency of acceptance
positions, 8.8% of the variation in frequency of rejection positions,
and 10.3% of the variation in frequency of noncommitment positions.
1
Nie, Statistical Package, p. 321.

TAL1

6R=.1.„)

22

STEMISE MULTIPLE hEGRESSION
IN 1.%-,:bT CCEPTABLE POSITIJN

,

Variable

Multiple h

Ls-teem

0.088

0.007

0.007

-0.088

-0.449

-0.107

Relevance

0.130

0.159

0.009

-0.085

-0.39.)

-0.094

Order

0.15.
;

0.244

0.007

-0.074

-0.35S

-0.086

Dopx,etism

0.157

0.024

0.006

0.033

0.75

0.018

(Constant)
a = p <-05, b = p4.01, c

Simple R

Beta

1.659
p<.001
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STEPWISE MULTIPLE REGRESSION
CRITEFICh VARIABLZ: ClikNGE IN FREQUENCY OF ACCEPTANDE POSITIOGJ

',/ariaLle

Multiple R

E Square

RSQ Change

Simple R

to

Relevance

0.180

0.322

0.322

-0.180

-1.213

-0.19C

order

0.210a

0.044

0.012

-0.113

-0.747

-0.117

Sex

a
0.232

0.054

0.010

-0.077

-0.628

-0.C9E

0.055

0.001

-0.005

-0.2113

-0.03!.

Esteem

0.235

a

(Constant)
a =

3.37'.
b

c - p<.001

STEPWISE MULTIPLE REGRESSION
C,HAIXLE IN FAEQUENCY OF NONC.CAMITMENT PXITION3

.ariablf
Relevance

' atiple R
0.250

a
b

R Square

RSQ Change

Simple R

B

Beta

0.052

0.02

0.250

2.991

0.262

0.082

0.020

0.148

1.704

0.149

,:raer

C.2r7

::)ex

0.316 b

0.100

0.017

0.131

- f lr
....4.,/

0.126

'Jogmatism

0.319 b

0.102

0.002

-0.068

-0.468

-0.041

Esteem

0.321 c

0.103

0.002

0.006

0.459

0.040

(Constant)

-7.429

a.p4.05, b = p<.01, c = /34..001

.43
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'
,EGRESSION
STEPWISE MULTIPLE
f
RZJEOTION MSITIONS
CRITERION VATIABLE: CHANGE IF

*:arlal.le
_.....
Helevance

;111tip1e R

R Square

RSQ Change

-imple R

B

Beta

0.232a

0.054

0.05!,.

-0.232

-1.813

-0.243

Order

0.2i0a

0.067

0.01!.

-0.122

-0.919

-0.123

Sex

0.285

0.081

0.014

-0.009

-0.e02

-0.10E

Dogr. tin..

0.293b

0.08;

0.005

0.090

0.483

0.0;5

2:steem

0.29;13

0.088

0.002

-0.01P

-0.344

b

(Constant)

a = p<.05, b

4.205

p<.01, c

.001

1%)
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STEPWISE MULTIPLE REGhESSIGN
CRITERION VARIABLE: ZHANGE IN AVERAGE ALCPTAE FO5ITI3N

a oquare

RSQ

0.251a

0.053

0.03

-0.251a

-0.679-- -- - -10.2 -9 '

0.273b

0.074

0.011

-0.113

-0.288

-0.110

0.292b

0.085

0.011

-0.075

-0.255

-0.097

Dogmatism

0.300b

0.090

0.001.

0.082

0.177

0.057

.:2steem

0.301b

0.090

0.000

0.008

-0.525

-0.020

.iaria'ole

:-.ultiple

Relevance
.)rder
:-e..‘

r

'Simple R

B

Beta

1.367

(Constant)
a = p<.05, b

Change

c = p<..001

%JD
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STEPWISE MULTIPLE REGRESSIGN
CRITERICN VARIABL:
AVLRAqE REJECTION Pg3ITI0N

VariaLle

Multiple R

it -quare

:1,5

Simple L

B

Beta

Relevance

-b
0.259

0.0:)7

0.0-S7

-0.259

-0.695

-0.266

Jrder

b
0.282

0.079

0.013

-0.118

-0.309

-0.118

Dogn t, r.

0.2
(44

0.087

0.007

0.093

0.192

0.373

Esteem

b
0.300

0.090

0.004

-0.021

-0.153

-0.00

Sex

b
0.30!.

C.092

0.002

-0.030

-0.129

-0.049

b

(Constant)
a -= p<..05„ b = p<.01, c = p‹.001

Change

1.277

1AEL
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STEMISE MULTIPLE REGRESSIU
CI;ITLRICE VARIABLL: ChANG?.. IN krt.rAGE NONUMMITMENT POSI7IC1'

arlaule

Multiple R

E. Square

RSQ Change

Simple R

B

Beta

0.068

0.005

0.005

0.068

0.190

0.070

Esteen,

0.085

0.007

0.00;

-0.047

-0.158

-0.158

Order

3.097

0.009

0.002

-0.040

-0.133

-0.049

Logm tisr.

0.106

0.011

0.002

-0.043

-0.117

-0.043

i-.1evance

0.113

0.013

0.002

0.038

0.109

0.040

(Constant)
a = p<.05, b = p<.01, c = p<.001

0.101

TABLE 29
STEFUISL MU-TIPLLrsIoN
,RITERION VARIAELE: RECALL

Variable

Multiple T

R Square

h3C4 Change

Simple R

Relevance

a
3.204

0.042

0.042

a
0.204

0.065

0.023

b

Beta
0.538

0.212

-C.154

-0.37-,

-0.146

Dogmatism

0.254

Esteem

b
0.285

0.081

0.017

0.123

0.319

0.126

Jrder

b
0.290

0.084

0.003

-0.056

-0.134

-0.053

0.086

0.001

-0.0'4.0

-0.113

-0.045

Sex

b
0.293

(Constar±)
a = p<.05, b =

2.900
c = p<:.001

9?
In terms of the average acceptance, rejection, and noncommitment
positions, the variables in combination account for 9.0% of the
variation in the average acceptance position, Q.3% of the variation
in the average rejection position, and 1.2% of the variation in the
average noncommitment position.

When attitude change was predicted

on the basis of the most acceptable position on the pre- and posttests
t:t variables in combination account for only

.5% of the variation.

Finally, the recall data suggest that the five variables account
for 8.6% of the variation in recall scores.

Summary
The purpose of
in the study.
(1)

tnlei

chapter is to report the results found

The analysis revealed several interesting findings:

Certain personality and demographic characteristics

affect persuasion in the general order effects paradigm.

It was

found that males high in esteem and dogmatism were not as easily
persuadea as females high in esteem and dogmatism.

Secondly, females

in esteem responded with a strong recency effect, while females
high in esteem responded with a strong primacy effect.

Finally,

subjects low in dogmatism recalled significantly more than subjects
high in dogmatism, and males low in dogmatism recalled sIgnificantiy
more than males high in dogmatism.
(2) Message relevance apparently dffects persuasion in the
general order effects paradigm.

Subjects who received the irrelevant

topic accepted significantly more than the subjects who received the
relevant topic.

Also, subjects who received the irrelevant topic

ill con-pro order were more persuaded toward the topic than subjects

98
in all other conditions.

Finally, the subjects in the irrelevant

condition recalled significantly more than subjects in the relevant
condition.
) The order of presentation was found to be important.
Subjects who received the speeches in con-pro order responded with
fewer noncommitment positions than subjects who received the speeches
in the pro-con order on the posttest than the pretest.

(4)

Contrary to expectations, the recall scores did not

correlate highly with the attitude change scores.
(5)

The five predictor variables provided only a small

explanation of the variance in attitude change scores and recall
scores.
The following chapter is devoted to a discussion of the
results.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS
Whereas the previous chapter dealt with a description of
the results, this chapter focuses on implications and conclusions
of the results.

The discussion focuses on the research questions

from the previous chapters.

Research :iuestion i
The first researzh question sought to determine the relation
of certain personality and demographic characteristics to order
The first finding concerns a significant sex difference

effects.

among subjects high in esteem and dogmatism.

Females increased their

latitudes of accepta7. e, while males actually decreased their
latit udes of acceptance from the pretest to the posttest (see
table 3).

This effect signifies that among sub:lects high in esteem

and dogmatiam, the degree of attitude change created will be greater
for females than for males, when opposing arguments advocate the
same amount of change.

This would seem to imply (in terms of the

magnitude of impact hypothesis) that a speaker should place much
more emphasis on attempting to persuade male subjects who have a
high degree of esteem and dogmatism than females who have a high
degree of esteem and dogmatism.
The finding of primacy and recency for females high and low
tri esteem on the basis of order of presentation must be interpreted
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in light of the three applicable theoretical hypothescs.

The set

explanation maintains that when using messages that are contiguous
with immediate testing after .,he last communication, the subjects
should respond with a primacy effect.

Lana, hosnow, and Thomas,

Webb, and Tweedie found these results using highly familiar,
1
The results of this study
interesting, and controversial topics.
shed further light on this interpretation in that the results
previously obtained may have cen due to differences in the degree
of esteem among fer,ales in the studies.

As esteem increases, the

likelihood of primacy increases: conversely, as esteem decreases,
the likelihood of recenQy increases.
Schultz, in his sensory variation hypothesis would have
likewise predicted a primacy effect under postulate 4a.

This postulate

maintains that when current issues are used a topics, and the issues
used are highly relevant to the subjects (i.e., interesting, familiar,
and controversial), the sterngth of primacy should increase.

Since

this is basically the same prediction that tne set explanation
offers, the previous discussion applies here as well.

Schultz's

hypothesis may also be modified to account for differences in degree
of esteem among female subjects.

Had the previous experiments

contained a large number of high esteem females, the results obtained would have been expected.

If the samples had contained

contained a higher number of females low in esteem, a recency effect
might have been the result.
1

For a more complete discussion of the issue, see pages

4 through 9.
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Finally, the Miller and Campbell explanation would have
predicted a recency effect as the messages were contiguous with
immediate testing after the last message.
was not found, however.

A general recency effect

Specifically, though, recency was the result

among females low in esteem, while primacy was the result among
females high in esteem.

No significant effects occurred among males

high or low in esteem.
These results do not disprove any of the existing theories.
Rather, they indicate that primacy and recency effects may be
better predicted by including subject self-esteem with novelty of
message, order of presentation, message relevance, and time of measures
and messages.

The results marginally support all of the theories

through a finding of a recency effect among females low in esteem,
and a primacy effect among females high in esteem.
In attempting to understand why females high in esteem
were more persuaded by the first argument, while females low in esteem
were more persuaded by the latter, it may help to analyze the results
in terms of the assumptions underlying the three models previously
noted.

Perhaps, then, it is obvious that if the set theory is

appropriate in its application to studies using current social issues
as topics, females high in esteem were more amenable to the EinstellAing or set response and as a result, responded more in terms of
initial material than subsequent material on the posttest.

It may

be that high esteem females consistently paid more attention to the
first message, while low esteem females paid more attention to the
second message.

On the other hand, it may be that females with high

esteem have 1 arned over time that if solution A works well in situation
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A, it may work just as well in situation B.

Thus, if their attitudes

are formed toward the concept (soiut on A) after hearing only
the initial material (situation A), the early attitude formed (solution A) may be adopted in the face of competing stimulation from
the second message (situation B).

Females low in esteem may have

failed over time to respond in this set producing manner.

Finally,

it may be that fema es low in esteem simply have more tolerance for
ambiguity than females high in esteem, though this speculation has
little empirical support.
Schultz's hypothesis 4a is geared more toward explaining
primacy as a function of message salience.

Still, however, on the

basis of the current research, one may assume that the effects
achieved were due to other factors such as receivers' sex and selfesteem, rather than due solely to the intensity of message stimulus
and cortical activation.

It may well be, for instance, that there is

an intensity of stimulus placement such that high esteem females regard
the initial position as more intense than the second, while females
low in esteem accept the second position as more influential.
This explanation may best be illustrated in the following two
examples:

In ,lournalimm a commonly accepted practice exists whereby

newspaper reporters present the most significant parts of a news story
first and the most trivial items last, in the form of an inverted
pyramid.

Moreover, it is common practice for newspaper editors

and compilers to arrange the whole paper such that the most important
events are presented first, with happenings of lesser significance
tucked away inside underneath same advertisement.

This obsession
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with "categorizing" items may carry over into our personal perception
of the importance of expressed ideas.

Thus, females high in esteem may

tend to regard the first position as more intense, while females
icy in esteem may regard the last as more intense, according to
different categorization principles.

Certainly the matter deserves

more attention.
Finally, the Miller and Campbell model assumes that primacy
or recency occurs due to the timing cf measures and messages.
Recency effects are expected in instances where the speeches are
contiguous and testing immediately after the last message--the condition established in the present study.

They assume that if one's

attitude is tested immediately after a communication, the communication will have an effect in its intended direction.

However, the

advantage for that effect will dissipate rapidly over time, such that
.ater the speech will have had negligible effects, and attitudes
will have perhaps reverted to those prior tc the communication.
Perhaps this temporary advantage of the moment is stronger for
females high in esteem.

Their attitudes formed after the first

communication iissipate less rapidly than the attitudes formed by
the low esteem femaies. This might account for the results obtained
in this study.
In terms of recall it was found that subjects low in
dogmatism recalled more than subjects high in dogmatism, and particularly that males low in dogmatism recalled more than males
nigh in dogmatismresults.

This is not surprising in light of expected

One would expect a relatively open-minded person to pay

more attention to two contradictory communications, while persons
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who are high in dogmatism would be expected to evaluate the situation,
form an early impression, and disregard later contradictory information.

As a result, subjects high in dogmatism would be expected

to select or retatain only those items from the second message
which supported the early opinion.

While the formulated opinions

among the subjects low in dogmatism might have a greater degree of
disparity and a lessened chance for primacy or recency trends, the
similarity of subjects high in dogmatism on the basis of their
selective attention and retention would be profound.

The sex difference

found may be further explained in that males low in dogmatism
would tend to pay even more attention to all the information presented
than the males high in dogmatism, who would be expected to be even
more selective in their attention.

This study was not designed to

test the relative effectiveness of the first argument as compared
with the effectiveness of the latter in terms of material recalled
fram each by subjects low and high in dogmatism.

Rather, it could

assess only differences that might have existed between groups in
'ems of the total amount of material recalled fram the total
message.

It would be advantageous for future research to take this

into account as it may be that one of the two positions has the
advantage (especially in relation to dogmatism) in terms of amount
of material recalled.

Research 74uestion
2
The second research question concerned differences that may
have existed due to the degree of interest, familiarity, and controversy of t,,e topic.

on the basis of previous research, it was
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expected that as message relevance increased, so would attention,
accuracy of perception, and comprehension.

The results from the

study do not support this conclusion: rather, they summest the opposite.
In numerous instances the irrelevant topic created more attitude
change and recall than the relevant topic.
This result must be interpreted in light of two experimental
artifacts.

First, as subjects were completing the pretest questionnaire,

a few students looked up in a perplexed manner and asked, 'What are
sunshine laws?"

It may have been possible that the two speech topics

were so immensely different in terms of familiarity such that
subjects who received the unfamiliar topic (sunshine laws) had
formulated little or no attitude toward them, while subjects
doubtlessly had an opinion toward co-ed dorms.

Thus, subjects in

the irrelevant condition were actually learning more, and subsequently
recalling more, than subjects in the relevant condition.

Secondly,

in two instances subjects wrote in the margin of the pretest, "I
am unable to make an evaluation with no knowledge of sunshine laws.
A simnificant number indicated totally neutral positions toward
the sunshine laws on the pretest.

After the message, however,

the attitudes were markedly different.

These findings tend to assure

the researcher that the irrelevant topic was indeed one which
was not interesting, familiar, nor controversial to the subjects.
The discrepancy present between the results achieved in this study
and those of earlier studies may thus be explained:

The irrelevant

topic used in this study was more irrelevant than those employed in
other studies.

Such irrelevant topics have included revenue sharing,

cancer research, and the need for bb shelters.
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Schultz maintained that primacy is to be expected when
topics that are highly interesting, controversial, and familiar
are employed.

A recency effect, or no effect, is expected for

topics that are not familiar, interesting, or controversial.

As

indicated above, the results of the current study do not support
this hypothesis.

If one compares the results of prior eAise7iments

with the results of this study, support is offered for an "incremental
effect" fcr message relevance such that highly relevant messages
may produce more attitude change and recall than moderately relevant
messages, but not more than highly irrelevant messages.

Specifically,

however, this conjecture is offered as a speculative explanation,
and empirical support is lacking.

Certainly more research is required.

Research 4yestion I
The third research question sought effects due to order
of presentation in a two-sided communication.

The first important

result uncovered here nas already been developed in the discdsson
of the three-way interaction of order by estem by sex in research
question 1.

Basically, a primacy effect was observed among females

high in esteem, while females low in esteem manifested a recency
effect.
Secondly, it was discovered that the con-pro order of
presentation in the irrelevant condition produced more positive
agreement than any other experimental condition.

This implies that

if a speaker is discussing a relatively uninteresting, unfamiliar,
and uncontroversial topic, it is best to place the con arguments first.
This does not prove, however, that it is pest to use this same

•
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patterning with highly interesting, 'amiliar, and controversial
topics.

Finally, this result must be interpreted in light of

the fact that the topic used for the irrelevaet condition was
calpletely novel for a few students.
No significant differences were present in an assessment of
the effects of order of presentation on recall.

Research question
The fourth research question concerned the ability of recall
to mediate the persuasive impact of a message.

The Miller and

Campbell model is even founded on that conceptual basis.

Had this

been a true relationship, the correlation between the amount of
material recalled and amount of attitude change created would
have been high.

The results did not support this hypothesis.

Anderson has suggested a possible explanation for this
result?

He argued that there are two sepe rate memory systems in

operation in general primacy-recency studies.

In impression form-

ation studies, subjects are subjected to short lists of adjectives,
and thus depend on the memory mechanism of "word memory".

In the

experimentally induced primacy studies the subjects absorb approximately equal amounts of information using an "idea memory", and
yet differ considerably in their attitudinal response to the messages.
Perhaps this could account for the negligible degrees of correlation
found.

See Crano's discussion in "Primacy versus Recency,"

94-95.

pp.
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Research question
As reported in chapter three, the data for this research
ouestion indicate a relatIvelv small amount of variance explained
in predicting attitude change and recall on the basis of the five
Perhaps there are other more important variables

predictor variables.

operative in the order effects paradigm, which, if incorporated
along with the subjects

dogmatism, sex, self-esteem, and order of

presentation, and relevance of material, will account for a greater
confidence in predicting attitude change and recall.
Still, however, the question arises as to why significant
category differences occurred, and yet the regression equations
produced were weak.

Perhaps the relationships among the variables

take on a nonlinear relationship.
In order to make the assumed nonlinear relationships linear,
when the exact nonlinear forms are unclear--as in the present case polynomial regression may be employed.

The general form of a

1 1
multivariate polynomial equation is given by T' ,= A , B1 X1 2 2
1 1
,2, 2 ,3„ 3
,2, 2
''- 1"
'1 Al "1
Al -• • *D2
A21 4- "2 A2
'23Y
'23
• *B"3 X3 - B3 13 Ikk
3 3
B X
, where Y' is the estimated value for T, A is
. .Bk

3 3

the T intercept, and Bi are the regression coefficients.

This

equation differs from the simple regression coefficient in that new
terms are created and added, hence the name polynomial.

The new

terms are successive powers of the original predictor variables.
The original variable is entered first, the second squared term is
entered on the second step, the third cubed term is entered on the
third step and so on.

In this manner a curved regression line may

be formed, and predictive accuracy increased.
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The use of polynomial regression still, however, did not
increase the assurance of the predictive equ Lion.

In fact, the

R Squares for all the equations were similar to those of the simple
regression equation (see table 30).
are at least moderately linear.

This indicates that the variables

Obviously other variables are important

and perhaps even necessary in order to predict attitude change and
recall.

Certainly future research should take these and ether

variables into account to explain even greater degrees of variation
in attitude change and recall.

Sunmaary
The conclusions from this quantitative research project
have led to a somewhat clear answer to the research questions.
It was found that subject dogmatism, self-esteem, sex, relevance of
material, and order of presentation differentially affect attitude
change and recall.

The data suggest that the theoretical explanations

for order effects are important for a background of research, but
are not the appropriate means to answer the questions inherent in
the question of primacy-recency.

Perhaps future research should

concentrate on the variables approach to the issue and uncover all
the concomitant factors that influence but not directly cause primacy
or recency.

In light of this present variables approach study,

that option is promising.
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TABLE 30
POLMOKIAL REGRESSION

Criterion Variable

R Square

Change in Most
Acceptable Position

0.025

Change in Frequency of
Acceptance Position

0.005

Change in Frequency of
Rejection Position

0.088

Ch.ingo in Frequency of
Noncommitment Position

0.103

Change in Average
Acceptance Position

0.090

Change in Average
Rejection Position

0.093

Chanve in Average
Noncaomitiment Position

0.013

Recall

0.086

a -pO5, b = p

.01, c

p<,.001
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Sunshine La:ss
Proponents of sunshine laws feel a serious need to continue
the enforcement of these laws not only on the Federal level but
also on the State and Local level. This need revolves around the
concept on which a Democracy is founded: The right of every citizen
to know. A sunshine law fills that need by allowing citizens to
attend governmental meetings. On the Federal level approximately
fifty agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission, the Interstate
Commerce Commission, and the influential Securities Exchange Commission,
are presently covered by a 197L law which required the opening of
most meetings to the public. The law specified nine exceptions
for which a meeting may be closed as in the case of a agency discussing
matters involving the national security, confidential matters, and
industrial trade secrets. Jn the State and Local level numerous laws
have been created to open agency meetings to the public, allowing for
similar exemptions.
The end result of such legislation is obvious. Interested
citizens now have the ieportant opportunity to attend agency meetings and
he informed of such operations, which may, in turn, help eliminate
citizen discontent. Concerned businesses may be able to forestall
unpleasant surprises by being aware that an agency regulation is
on the way, as well as knowing the regulators' intent. Finally,
the laws may help members of the agency realize that there are more
people out there than the members of the industry they regulate.
Opponents of sunshine laws feel an earnest need to eliminate,
or at least curb the use of the laws which allow citizens to attend
Federal, State or Local agency meetings. Currently citizens may attend
the agency meetings of about fifty Federal agencies and numerous state
and Local agencies in all instances except those exempted by law. While
the right to be informed is a truly Democratic ideal, the laws cannot
bring about increased awareness in the public for several reaeons.
First, it is fair to assame that the citizen who sincerely
wishes to be informed is a member of a distinct minority. In most instances
the majority of people attending the open meetings are lobbyists for
special interest groups and certain public interest groups: in general
the public stays away. It is simply not fair to construct and enforce
a
law for such an indifferent and apathetic minority.
Secondly, many agencies continue to close their doors by
stretching the exemptions which allow them to do so if it is likely that
an open meeting will frustrate the implementation of the proposed
agency action. Few citizens contest these closures.
Moreover, the implementation of the laws increases the glut of
governmental paperwork as agendas must be made public a week in advance
and transcripts of all discussion is required. This fact
obviously
concerns businessess, for the prospect of having statements
offered in
a private meeting made public by the requests of other
businesses for
such transcripts is an ever present and terrible
fear.
For these reasons opponents argue that the laws should be
eliminated or at least curbed.
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Co-ed Dorms
Some would aeree that Western Kentucky University could benifit
from a co-ed dorm policy. The words "co-ed dorm" no doubt bring to mind
for some if not most people the picture of a boy and girl rooming together sharing everything but clothes. This, however, is not always
the case, for there ere numeorus options for co-ed facilities. A co-ed
dorm may be one in which men and women share different wings, or different
floors, or adjoining rooms, or in a few isolated examples, the same room.
Among existing co-ed facilities around the nation certain
advantages have been uncovered. First, a "family image" seems to develop
among students n co-ed dorms. Students easily fall into brother-sister
relationships, and thu - xplicit sexual affairs seldom develop between
those involved. Severe_ studies indicate that students in such dorms
tend to have more active social lives, more self confidence, and do
better in coursework than those intraditional dorms. The studies also
indicate that due to strong peer pressure, lack of privacy, and activity
programs, much nonsexual friendship develops and group participation
increases. Also, there appears to be an educational value for co-ed
residence, namely that of a better learning environment. As one male
her. you are seperated from the girls, all you think
student put it:
of are girls."
Concerning the inadequacy of physical facilities, in most instances no changes would be required. In nearly all instances,
students could share seperate wings of the same building. where there
are communal bathroom facilities there could be alternating floor
arrangements: where facilities between the rooms are shared, students
could be suit mates or at least share the same floor, and possible
even be roommstes.
For these reasons Western could benifit from a co-ed dorm policy.
Opponents of co-ed dormitory facilities argue that Western
would not benifit from a policy which would allow men and women to
share different wings, floors, rooms, or even the same rooms of a
building. In fact, certain problems are expected with such a policy.
The students who have endured such experiences constantly
beery the total absence ofprivacy and the loss of camaraderie among
those of the opposite sex. Too often they vie for attention among themselves, and as a consequence spend far too little time with those of the
same sex, a consequence indicative of anything but the "family image."
'eelatively few qualified studies have been conducted to assess
the educational implications, and no clear consise advantages have been
found. Little educational merit exists for such a policy.
In terms of the development of nonsexual friendships, an overwhelming advantage exists for the traditional dorms if one considers
the quality of friendships. Co-ed friendships often develop due to the
close proximity, and are often shallow and surface in nature. Traditional
friendships are ,
f enerally more substantial and long-lasting.
A major problem arises when one also considers the present inadequacy
of physical facilities. In many instances the buildings would not
adequately accomodate the needs of co-ed residence due to communal
bathrooms, bathrooms between rooms, and elevators that open on all
floors. The cost to correct those inadequacies would be excessively high.
For these reasons Uestern would not significantly benifit
from such a policy.
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INSTRUCTIONS: Flace an "A" in the tianks above all the percentages
with which you would agree. Circle the one "A" that best reflects
your feelings about sunshine laws (or co-ed dormatory policies, depending
on the subject's condition). Indicate all the percentages you would
reject by placing an "h" in the blanks above those percentages.
7ndicate the percentages about which you haie no commitment by placing
a "y'" in the blanks above those percentages. Make your evaluation
according to all three continuums. For example:
=LI:CATION IS:
Important

A
100%

: A :
:
75% 504 25;4 0%

R : E :
: F:
Trivial
254 50% 751 100%

This student felt that education is 75% important but was also willing
to accept that it may be 10C1 to 25% important. He rejected education
being 25% to 100% trivial and was not committed about it being az
important or trivial,

SUNSHINE LAWS AFE: (or S0-ED DORMITOFY FOLIGIES ARE:)

Good

bad
1

751

5O. 25 -

0:

25

50% 75% 1001

1001

75%

50%

01

259

50%

Foolish

Yise
25%

-5% 1001

Valuable

100% -757 50%

-57- 25% 50% 75% 100%

I':orthless

AFFeNDIX
I.LALLZjEZTIONNAIi..EZ

Sunshine Laws Zpeech
1.

The IC74 law required how many Federal agencies tc have
C) 50 D) 9
open meetings? A) 30 E)

2.

How many exceptions did the 197!+ law provide?
C) 13 D) 15

A) C

I) 11

3. Sunshine laws may help to eliminate what?

A) Agency corruption
by business interests 2,) Citizen discontent C) Unfair
agency regulation D) none of the above

Who is a meml:er of a distinct minority? A) Lobbyists who
want to be informed E) Public interest groups who want to
be informed C) Citizens who want to le informed D) Regulators
who want to be reformed

5.

The agencies continue to close meetings by A) Notation voting
E) Perusing to meet ') Stretching exempticns D) All of the
above

5.

Governmental paper work is increased by sunshine laws because
A) agendas must be made public one week in advance E) Transcripts of discussion must be kept C) Neither A nor E
D) Eoth A and E

Co-:d Dorm Speech
I.

A dorm mav
co-ed if A) men and women share different
wings 2) men and women share different floors C) men and
women share the same roam D) all of the above

2.

Studies indicate students in co-ed dorms A) do worse in
course work 2) lead more active social lives C) have less
self confidence D) all of the above.

1.

Due to
much nonsexual friendship develops in co-ed dorms.
A) strong peer pressure E) lack of privacy C) activity
programs D) all of the above
In traditional dorms there are A) fewer nonsexual friendships
E) better nonsexual friendships C) both A and F D) neither A
nor D
Students often speend time in co-ed dorms A) mostly with members
of the same sex F) mostly with the opposite sex C) about the
same with members of t3th sexes D) mostly alone

115
i.

There is A) less camaraderie in co-ed dorms E) more camaraderie
in co-ed dorms L;) about the same level of camaraderie in
both types of dorns
APPENDIX D
DOGMATISM SCALE

INSTRUCTI3N3: Place an "X" in the blank above the position that most
nearly reflects your feelings about yourself. Make your evaluation
indicates item included in the final
according to each statensent.
S-Item short form.)
-

In this cot.plicated world of ours the only way to know what's
going on is to rely on leaders and experts who can be trusted.

Ztrongly
Agree
2.

Agree

!:eutral

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's
wrong.
There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the
truth, and those who are against the truth.

4. :.:ost people just don't know what's good for them.
5.

Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world,
there is probably only one which is correct.

f).

The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.

7.

Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper
they are printed on.

n

It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal cr cause
that life becomes meaningful.

9.

It is often desir able to reserve judgement about what's going on
until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.

10.

lost people really don't care about others.

6ELF

3eALx:

INSTRUCTIONS: Place an ":." in tleposition that most nearly reflects
your feelings about yourself. Make your evaluation according to
each set of statements.
I am often bothered with
feelings of uselessness.
basically think of myself
as an unhappy person.

am seldom bothered wita
feelings of uselessness.
basically think of mysali:
as a happy person.

I an seldom bothered
with feelings of
inferiority.

I am frequently bothered
with feelings of
inferiority.

I feel I can do most
things well.

I often feel there is
nothing I can do well.

an often afraid.

I am seldom afraid.

I have very much
to be proud of.

I have very little
to be proud of.

I often wish I were
someone else.
There are few things about
myself I would change
if I had the chance.
am confident my plans
will turn out the way
want them to.
I seldom get discouraged.

I am glad
I am myself.
here are many things
about myself I would chalge
if I had the chance.
I often doubt my plans
will turn out the way
I want them to.
I often get discourar,ed.
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